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CORPORATE POLITICAL POWER: THE POLITICS OF
REPUTATION & TRACEABILITY
Amanda Shanor
Mary-Hunter McDonnell
Timothy Werner*
ABSTRACT
We live, it is said, in a second Gilded Age, in which politics is dominated by
corporate power and elite business interests. But how does corporate money
flow into politics? This Article provides an original empirical analysis of when
and why corporations engage in particular forms of political activity and uses
those findings to develop a novel, empirically-grounded approach to the First
Amendment’s treatment of traceability mandates in politics.
We analyze the conditions under which firms shift between (1) using their
political action committees (PACs) to contribute to candidates and political
parties, and (2) engaging in less traceable forms of political activity, like
lobbying, in which the specific targets of firms’ influence efforts are unknown.
This Article identifies a key variable that explains when and why corporations
shift from lighter (more traceable and direct) to darker (less traceable and more
indirect) channels of political engagement. We demonstrate that corporate
political activity grows darker as a firm’s reputation grows more negative. This
dynamic produces the disquieting result that the corporate political
interventions that are likely to be the most controversial are also those most
likely to be deployed in ways the public is least able to monitor.
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Our findings indicate that the traceability of money creates a concrete limit
on the ability of corporate actors to influence politics—a limit which plausibly
applies to political giving more broadly. Corporate donors who are seen as
political liabilities find it increasingly difficult to locate politicians who will
openly take their money or accept other support. Politicians refuse or return
traceable donations from disreputable donors. Our research thus demonstrates
that the power of business in politics is more conditional than generally
appreciated.
This Article uses these empirical findings to interrogate the relationship
between traceability mandates in politics and theories of the First Amendment.
While the Supreme Court has prominently struck down restrictions on money in
politics in cases like Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, it has
repeatedly upheld a variety of disclosure requirements. For a range of reasons,
including the Supreme Court’s decision in Americans for Prosperity Foundation
v. Bonta, however, disclosure mandates are likely to become an increasingly
important site of conflict in both policy and litigation, making it ever more
important to assess and theorize the justifications for them.
Our research suggests an empirically-grounded justification: traceability
alters politicians’ behavior, causing them to act more consistently with public
opinion. In other words, traceability mandates make politicians more
accountable to the people. At the same time, there is evidence that traceability
policies, and the reduction of darker corporate money in politics they produce,
promote the public’s belief that their views shape the political system.
Traceability mandates, in sort, advance both objective and subjective forms of
democratic accountability. We thus argue that policies that advance the
traceability of corporate money in politics not only further core First
Amendment values but may be required by them.
By identifying how and why corporate money flows into politics at a fine
level of detail, this Article also provides important information that policy
makers can use to craft campaign finance and lobbying reforms. Our empirical
findings and theoretical analysis support policy changes that increase the
traceability of corporate money in politics, including broader and more robust
disclosure requirements for corporate lobbying and individual donations made
by corporate executives and directors.
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INTRODUCTION
If you have paid any attention to American politics in the last ten years, you
have heard that the political system is broken, awash in corporate money. The
public is increasingly wary of corporate power and money in politics,1 and
polling suggests that an overwhelming majority of Americans support the
reduction of corporate influence in the political system.2
The storming and siege of the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021—and the
spotlight it cast on the gravity of threats to American democracy—sent
shockwaves through the world of corporate political giving. Many prominent
firms, including Morgan Stanley, Walmart, Disney, and Amazon, publicly
committed to not make donations to the Republican lawmakers who opposed the
certification of the Electoral College votes making Joe Biden the 46th President.3
Others, such as Goldman Sachs, Facebook, McDonald’s, and Visa, paused all
political giving.4 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce—“the nation’s largest
business lobbying group”—strongly “condemned President Trump’s conduct
that led to” the insurrection, and vowed that politicians who “backed his efforts

1
MARK A. SMITH, AMERICAN BUSINESS AND POLITICAL POWER: PUBLIC OPINION, ELECTIONS, AND
DEMOCRACY 101 (2000).
2
See, e.g., Bradley Jones, Most Americans Want to Limit Campaign Spending, Say Big Donors Have
Greater Political Influence, PEW RSCH. CTR. (May 8, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/05/
08/most-americans-want-to-limit-campaign-spending-say-big-donors-have-greater-political-influence/ (“77%
of the public says ‘there should be limits on the amount of money individuals and organizations’ can spend on
political campaigns . . . .”); Steven Kull, Evan Fehsenfeld, Francesca Martens & Evan Charles Lewitus,
Americans Evaluate Campaign Finance Reform: A Survey of Voters Nationwide, PROGRAM FOR PUB.
CONSULTATION 3, 7–8 (May 2018), https://www.publicconsultation.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/
Campaign_Finance_Report.pdf (showing “large [bipartisan] majorit[ies] favor[] a Constitutional amendment to
overturn . . . Citizens United” and support greater mandatory disclosure of campaign donations); Daniel Hensel,
New Poll Shows Money in Politics Is a Top Voting Concern, ISSUE ONE (June 29, 2016), https://www.issueone.
org/new-poll-shows-money-in-politics-is-a-top-voting-concern/ (noting 78% of respondents say sweeping new
laws are “need[ed] . . . to reduce the influence of money in politics”); New Poll: Americans Condemn High
Levels of Corporate Political Spending, Overwhelmingly Support Strong Transparency and Accountability
Reforms, PUB. CITIZEN (Oct. 25, 2012), https://www.citizen.org/news/new-poll-americans-condemn-highlevels-of-corporate-political-spending-overwhelmingly-support-strong-transparency-and-accountabilityreforms/ (citing surveys in which 90% of respondents say “there is . . . too much corporate money in politics”
and 81% think firms should have to disclose political spending).
3
Judd Legum & Tesnim Zekeria, Major Corporations Say They Will Stop Donating to Members of
Congress Who Tried to Overturn the Election, POPULAR INFO. (Jan. 10, 2021), https://popular.info/p/threemajor-corporations-say-they; see also Lucas Manfredi, McDonald’s, Nike, Boeing, Wells Fargo Latest to Share
Stance on Pausing Political Donations After Capitol Riots, FOX BUS. (Jan. 10, 2021), https://www.foxbusiness.
com/money/capitol-riot-pause-political-giving-pac (listing companies that suspended political giving).
4
Manfredi, supra note 3. A number of firms also announced they would suspend donations to the
Republican Attorney General’s Association. Judd Legum & Tesnim Zekeria, After Riot, Major Corporations
Suspend Donations to the Republican Attorneys General Association, POPULAR INFO. (Jan. 13, 2021),
https://popular.info/p/after-riot-major-corporations-suspend.
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to discredit the election would no longer receive the [Chamber’s] financial
backing.”5 As said by Morgan Stanley and Merck board member Thomas
Glocer,6 “[w]e have to create some level of cost” for supporting acts that threaten
our democracy, explaining that “[m]oney is the key way” to do that.7
It is too early to tell whether the corporate world’s political rebuke will last
or have a meaningful effect on the future trajectory of the Republican Party,
which is now roiled by internal conflict. In the wake of the events of January 6,
Chairman and CEO of JPMorgan Chase Jamie Dimon asserted with regard to
corporate political giving that “[n]o one thought they were giving money to
people who supported sedition.”8 Regardless of whether that is true, it is difficult
to deny the significant role of corporate money in the arc of American politics—
and the increasingly loud calls to regulate it.
Prominent candidates have long called for sweeping reforms to take the
political process away from corporations and the ultra-wealthy and put it back
in the hands of the people—including dramatically increasing disclosure around
lobbying and other corporate political activity, requiring all lobbyists to register,
and limiting the ability of lobbyists to move in and out of government jobs.9
Democrats introduced a constitutional amendment to overturn Citizens United
v. Federal Election Committee, with the 2016 Democratic party platform
asserting, “We need to end secret, unaccountable money in politics by requiring,
through executive order or legislation, significantly more disclosure and
transparency—by outside groups, federal contractors, and public corporations to
their shareholders.”10 By 2020, every Democratic presidential candidate in the
election vowed to turn down donations from corporate political action
committees (PACs), and many pledged to refuse support from federal lobbyists

5
Alan Rappeport, Chamber of Commerce Calls Trump’s Conduct ‘Inexcusable’ and Vows to Curb
Certain Donations, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/12/us/chamber-of-commercetrump.html?searchResultPosition=8.
6
Emily Glazer & Chip Cutter, CEOs Consider Ways to Smooth Biden’s Presidential Transition,
Including Holding Back Campaign Money, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 6, 2021, 9:34 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
ceos-consider-ways-to-smooth-the-presidential-transition-including-holding-back-campaign-money-11609943
649; David Leonhardt, A Corporate Backlash, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/
12/briefing/trump-mob-impeachment-gorillas-san-diego-zoo.html?searchResultPosition=15.
7
Leonhardt, supra note 6.
8
David Gelles, ‘We Need to Stabilize’: Big Business Breaks with Republicans, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15,
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/15/business/republicans-business-trump.html?searchResultPosition=
23.
9
See, e.g., Kenneth P. Vogel & Glenn Thrush, Biden Faces Pressure from Left Over Influence Industry
Ties, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/01/us/politics/biden-lobbyist-ties.html.
10
DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM COMM., 2016 DEMOCRATIC PARTY PLATFORM 23 (July 8–9, 2016),
https://democrats.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2019/07/2016_DNC_Platform.pdf.
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as well.11 Several, including Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders, ran on
platforms focused on getting corporate money out of politics.12
Oversight and disclosure of political spending and lobbying activity is now
the most common issue in shareholder proposals.13 In the last decade, over 500
such proposals were filed among Fortune 250 companies, and those proposals
averaged shareholder support of 23.4%—significantly higher than the 15%
average garnered by other social proposals.14
At the same time, robust political science research has shown that the
influence of corporate money in politics is a significant driver of economic
inequality,15 with the gap between the rich and the rest reaching proportions not

11
Hailey Fuchs & Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Democrats Swore Off Donations from Lobbyists and Fossil Fuel
Execs. But Some Are Skirting Their Own Rules, WASH. POST (July 29, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/democrats-swore-off-donations-from-lobbyists-and-fossil-fuel-execs-but-some-are-skirting-their-ownrules/2019/07/29/7ac49a3c-ae14-11e9-b071-94a3f4d59021_story.html.
12
Breaking the Political Influence of Market-Dominant Companies, WARREN DEMOCRATS,
https://elizabethwarren.com/plans/break-monopoly-influence (last visited Nov. 16, 2021); Get Big Money Out
of Politics and Restore Democracy, BERNIE, https://berniesanders.com/issues/free-and-fair-elections/ (last
visited Nov. 16, 2021); see Aiden Smith, The Overlooked Difference Between Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth
Warren, NATION (July 23, 2019), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/the-overlooked-difference-betweenbernie-sanders-and-elizabeth-warren/; Osita Nwanevu, Elizabeth Warren, Bernie Sanders, and Two Paths for
the American Left, NEW YORKER (June 18, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/elizabethwarren-bernie-sanders-and-two-paths-for-the-american-left.
13
See Heidi Welsh & Michael Passoff, ProxyPreview 2021, AS YOU SOW, https://www.proxypreview.
org/2021/report (last visited Nov. 16, 2021).
14
Data provided by Manhattan Inst., Proxy Monitor: Shedding Light on the Influence of Shareholder
Proposals on Corporations, PROXY MONITOR, https://www.proxymonitor.org/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2021).
Averages were obtained by the authors by using the “Search Fortune 250 Shareholders Proposals” query search,
exporting search results for proposals filed between 2011 and 2021, and averaging shareholder approvals in
Microsoft Excel. These calculations for political spending and lobbying activity were derived from examining
the average shareholder approval vote for all proposals categorized as “Lobbying,” “Lobbying and Political
Spending,” and “Political Spending.” The average support of “other social proposals” was derived by averaging
the support of all “Social Policy” proposals submitted over this period, excluding “Lobbying,” “Lobbying and
Political Spending,” and “Political Spending.”
15
See JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS: HOW WASHINGTON MADE THE
RICH RICHER—AND TURNED ITS BACK ON THE MIDDLE CLASS 75–78 (2010) [hereinafter HACKER & PIERSON,
HOW WASHINGTON MADE THE RICH RICHER]; Jacob S. Hacker & Paul Pierson, Winner-Take-All Politics: Public
Policy, Political Organization, and the Precipitous Rise of Top Incomes in the United States, 38 POL. & SOC’Y
152, 154 (2010) [hereinafter Hacker & Pierson, Public Policy]; Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing
Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSPS. POL. 564, 566, 576
(2014) [hereinafter Gilens & Page, Testing Theories]; Benjamin I. Page, Larry M. Bartels & Jason Seawright,
Democracy and the Policy Preferences of Wealthy Americans, 11 PERSPS. POL. 51, 51, 63 (2013); Martin Gilens,
Inequality and Democratic Responsiveness, 69 PUB. OP. Q. 778, 793–94 (2005); Matthew Luttig, The Structure
of Inequality and Americans’ Attitudes Toward Redistribution, 77 PUB. OP. Q. 811, 811–12 (2013); Nathan J.
Kelly & Peter K. Enns, Inequality and the Dynamics of Public Opinion: The Self-Reinforcing Link Between
Economic Inequality and Mass Preferences, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 855, 867, 869 (2010); Michael Barber & Nolan
McCarty, Causes and Consequences of Polarization, in NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT IN POLICY 19, 30 (Jane
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seen since the first Gilded Age.16 As Rick Hasen has explored, lobbying in
particular threatens national economic welfare by facilitating rent-seeking,
namely when individuals or groups, such as corporations, use lobbyists to
capture government transfers.17 We are, many have observed, in a second Gilded
Age in which corporate power and elite business interests dominate our political
system.18
Mansbridge & Cathie Jo Martin eds., 2013); Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Critics Argued with Our
Analysis of U.S. Political Inequality. Here Are 5 Ways They’re Wrong., WASH. POST (May 23, 2016), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/05/23/critics-challenge-our-portrait-of-americaspolitical-inequality-heres-5-ways-they-are-wrong/; see also Heather K. Gerken & Alex Tausanovitch, A Public
Finance Model for Lobbying: Lobbying Campaign Finance, and the Privatization of Democracy, 13 ELECTION
L.J. 75, 80, 83 (2014) (observing that organizations like the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC)
have stepped into the gap created by lack of information and funding for research faced by lawmakers, “resulting
in a multimillion dollar [lobbying] industry funded largely by corporate dollars,” such that legislators “depend
on private actors to do their job, thus introducing concerns about corruption, equality, and the like”). But see
Peter K. Enns, Relative Policy Support and Coincidental Representation, 13 PERSPS. POL. 1053, 1054 (2015);
Omar S. Bashir, Testing Inferences About American Politics: A Review of the “Oligarchy” Result, 2 RSCH. &
POL. 1, 5 (2015); J. Alexander Branham, Stuart N. Soroka & Christopher Wlezien, When Do the Rich Win?, 132
POL. SCI. Q. 43, 51–52 (2017).
16
See, e.g., Share of the Nation’s Income Earned by the Top 1 Percent, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/10/26/nyregion/the-new-gilded-age.html (reporting “[i]n 1928, the
top 1% earned 23.94% of the nation’s income,” a percentage not rivaled until 2007, when “[t]he top 1[%] earned
23.5% of the nation’s income”); THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 331–32 (Arthur
Goldhammer trans., 2017) [hereinafter PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY]; Thomas Piketty &
Emmanuel Saez, Inequality in the Long Run, 344 SCI. 838, 838 (2014); Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez,
Income Inequality in the United States, 1913-1998, 118 Q.J. ECON. 1, 1–2 (2003) [hereinafter Piketty & Saez,
Income Inequality in the United States].
That graph of income moderated to some extent after the 2008 market crash, with the top 1% receiving
22.5% of the nation’s income in 2012, while the bottom 90% received less than half. See Drew Desilver, 5 Facts
About Economic Inequality in 2014, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/
2014/01/07/5-facts-about-economic-inequality/ (explaining “U.S. income inequality is the highest [it has] been
since 1928”).
The COVID-19 pandemic has fueled even more entrenched inequality, including along race lines. See, e.g.,
Aaron van Dorn, Rebecca E. Cooney & Miriam L. Sabin, COVID-19 Exacerbating Inequalities in the U.S., 395
LANCET 1243, 1243 (2020).
17
See Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the Constitution, 64 STAN. L. REV. 191, 229
(2012). John Coates has similarly explored how corporate First Amendment litigation may act “as a form of rent
seeking.” John C. Coates IV, Corporate Speech & the First Amendment: History, Data, and Implications, 30
CONST. COMMENT. 223, 224, 271 (2015).
18
See Joseph Fishkin, Courts and Constitutional Political Economy, LPE PROJECT (July 24, 2021),
https://lpeproject.org/blog/courts-and-constitutional-political-economy/; GANESH SITARAMAN, THE CRISIS OF
THE MIDDLE-CLASS CONSTITUTION: WHY ECONOMIC INEQUALITY THREATENS OUR REPUBLIC 242–43 (2017);
Kate Andrias, The Fortification of Inequality: Constitutional Doctrine and the Political Economy, 93 IND. L.J.
5, 6 (2018); Ganesh Sitaraman, The Puzzling Absence of Economic Power in Constitutional Theory, 101
CORNELL L. REV. 1445, 1456, 1461 (2016) [hereinafter Sitaraman, The Puzzling Absence of Economic Power in
Constitutional Theory]; Joseph Fishkin & William Forbath, Reclaiming Constitutional Political Economy: An
Introduction to the Symposium on the Constitution and Economic Inequality, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1287, 1287–88
(2016); K. SABEEL RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY AGAINST DOMINATION 166, 178 (2016); Joseph Fishkin & William
E. Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution, 94 B.U. L. REV. 669, 690 (2014); David Singh Grewal & Jedediah
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One reason why corporate money in politics has increased inequality, as
political scientists Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page have demonstrated, is
because “economic elites and organized groups representing business interests
have substantial independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while massbased interest groups and average citizens have little or no independent
influence.”19 Critically, this includes influence on “large-scale public policies
that mediate distributional outcomes,”20 such as tax policy and financial
regulation.
This development has taken place over roughly the last forty years, as
business interests have become increasingly politically active. As Jacob Hacker
and Paul Pierson have described, the organized ability of business interests to
influence distributional laws and policies has dramatically increased since the
1970s, while the political power of middle-class interests, key among them
unions, has sharply declined.21 Because law and policy shape and structure
markets in ways that influence distributional outcomes, this shift has enhanced
the political power of groups that favor policies that fuel windfalls for the elite
and thereby inequality itself. The result has been the now defining feature of the
U.S. economy: the hyper-concentration of wealth and income among a small
fraction of the elite, which has been maintained and increased since
approximately 1980 despite recessions, booms, and repeated shifts in the
partisan control of Congress and the presidency.22 The political influence of
economic elites, in other words, has been central to the advent of the second
Gilded Age.
But how do corporate money and influence flow into politics? Earlier work
on corporate political activity has focused on its antecedents, tactics, and
effects.23 The circumstances in which firms engage in particular forms of
Purdy, Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 3, 21 (2014); Jack Balkin, The
First Amendment in the Second Gilded Age, 66 BUFF. L. REV. 979, 979, 980 (2018). For work in political science
and economics on this point, see supra note 15 and infra note 23.
19
Gilens & Page, Testing Theories, supra note 15, at 565.
20
Hacker & Pierson, Public Policy, supra note 15, at 154.
21
Id. at 171–82.
22
See, e.g., id. at 155–59; PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 16, at 439
fig.10.5; Piketty & Saez, Income Inequality in the United States, supra note 16.
23
For work on the effects of corporate political activity on economic inequality, see HACKER & PIERSON,
HOW WASHINGTON MADE THE RICH RICHER, supra note 15; on lobbying, see Jason W. Ridge, Amy Ingram &
Aaron D. Hill, Beyond Lobbying Expenditures: How Lobbying Breadth and Political Connectedness Affect Firm
Outcomes, 60 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1138, 1139 (2017); Sean Lux, T. Russel Crook & David J. Woehr, Mixing
Business with Politics: A Meta-Analysis of the Antecedents and Outcomes of Corporate Political Activity, 37 J.
MANAGEMENT 223, 223–25 (2011); on campaign contributions, see Rajesh K. Aggarwal, Felix Meschke &
Tracey Yue Wang, Corporate Political Donations: Investment or Agency?, 14 BUS. & POL. 1 (2012); Joshua L.
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political activity—for example, when and why they spend treasury funds to
lobby, use their PACs to make contributions, or engage in other, less traceable,
forms of politics—has received relatively little academic attention.24
Despite prominent calls by politicians, shareholders, and the public for
policies to rein in, expose, and democratize corporate political activity, it
remains unclear how campaign finance regulations—whether imposed formally
by governments or shareholders, or informally by other corporate
stakeholders—affect corporate political practices.
This Article fills that gap by contributing an original empirical assessment
of when and why corporations deploy different methods of political influence.
It identifies a key reason why corporate donations shift from more transparent
and direct (“lighter”) channels to less traceable and more indirect (“darker”)
channels of political engagement. We find that corporate political activity grows
darker—that is, shifts towards less traceable forms of activities that are subject
to less rigorous or no forms of public disclosure—as a firm’s public reputation
falls. The disquieting result is that the corporate political interventions that are
likely to be the most controversial are also those most likely to be deployed in
ways the public is least able to monitor.
In so finding, this Article identifies a novel limit on the flow of corporate
money into the political process. In The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance
Reform, Sam Issacharoff and Pam Karlan argued that “money, like water, has to
go somewhere. It never really disappears into thin air.”25 That is, they
maintained that money, like water, will find a path around potential obstacles.
Our findings point to a limitation on that seeming inevitability. We provide new
empirical detail on both when and why corporate money flows into politics,
providing important information that policy makers can use to craft effective
campaign finance reforms. Further, our research indicates that requiring public
disclosure creates concrete limits on the ability of corporate actors to influence
politics—limits which plausibly attend to political giving more broadly. As the

Kalla & David E. Broockman, Campaign Contributions Facilitate Access to Congressional Officials: A
Randomized Field Experiment, 60 AM. J. POL. SCI. 545, 545–56 (2016); on covert grassroots mobilization, see
EDWARD T. WALKER, GRASSROOTS FOR HIRE: PUBLIC AFFAIRS CONSULTANTS IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 109,
129 (2014); Thomas P. Lyon & John M. Maxwell, Astroturf: Interest Group Lobbying and Corporate Strategy,
13 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 561, 563–64 (2004).
24
But see Werner, supra note 13; Micky Tripathi, Stephen Ansolabehere & James M. Snyder, Jr., Are
PAC Contributions and Lobbying Linked? New Evidence from the 1995 Lobbying Disclosure Act, 4 BUS. & POL.
131 (2002).
25
Sam Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV.
1705, 1708 (1999).
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reputation of corporate contributors falls (consider, for example, the toxic
reputation of Enron), politicians who would otherwise accept their donations,
lobbying support, or other support begin to view association with such
distasteful donors as a political liability. Donors who are seen as political
liabilities have increasing difficulty finding politicians who will take their
money, as long as that money can be traced—just as corporate backlash in the
post-insurrection period suggests the reverse to be true.
Consider the case of British Petroleum and the Deepwater Horizon disaster,
which killed eleven people and created the largest oil spill in U.S. history.26 Less
than one month after BP’s platform exploded in the Gulf of Mexico in April
2010, U.S. Representative Charles Gonzalez returned a campaign contribution
from the firm, arguing that “it makes good sense on everyone’s part for a
company PAC to suspend campaign money during a period of scrutiny.”27 A
corporate donor’s bad reputation, or politicians’ belief that the donor’s
reputation is politically harmful, constrains traceable corporate political activity.
Politicians, in other words, want to avoid traceable associations with publicly
unpopular firms. In this way, the power of a business in politics is conditional
on its public reputation.
Taking Issacharoff and Karlan’s insight seriously—that “political money,
like water, is part of a broader ecosystem” and “[u]nderstanding why [money]
flows where it does . . . requires thinking about the system as a whole”28—we
conclude that broader and more rigorous disclosure requirements would limit
the absolute amount of corporate money in politics. Our research thus identifies
a meaningful limit to Issacharoff and Karlan’s analogy. Money will indeed go
somewhere, but, unlike water, traceable money will not go around all obstacles.
Rather, traceable money will stay in the pocket of a corporate donor with whom
no politician is willing to be seen.
Our findings support broader and more robust disclosure requirements,
including with regard to corporate lobbying and individual donations by CEOs,
C-suite executives, and directors. The latter recommendation is responsive to
26
See, e.g., Deep Water Horizon–BP Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.
epa.gov/enforcement/deepwater-horizon-bp-gulf-mexico-oil-spill (Dec. 4, 2020); Darryl Fears, The Toxic Reach
of Deepwater Horizon’s Oil Spill Was Much Larger—And Deadlier—Than Previous Estimates, a New Study
Says, WASH. POST (Feb. 12, 2020, 4:53 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2020/02/
12/toxic-reach-deepwater-horizons-oil-spill-was-much-larger-deadlier-than-previous-estimates-new-studysays/.
27
Dave Levinthal, How Corporate PACs Handle Bad PR, POLITICO (July 30, 2012), https://www.
politico.com/story/2012/07/how-corporate-pacs-deal-with-bad-pr-079161.
28
See Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 24, at 1708.
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firms’ use of their CEOs to make less traceable donations though the obfuscation
of employer relationships in disclosures. To give two notable examples from our
research, Jamie Dimon, Chairman and CEO of JPMorgan Chase—the largest
and most valuable bank in the United States—made one campaign contribution
in relation to which his occupation was listed merely as “Investor.” Microsoft’s
then-CEO Steve Ballmer made a contribution related to which his employment
information was undisclosed—described only as “requested.”29 The key
ingredient to effective reforms, our research demonstrates, is traceability—that
is, the extent to which political spending creates an easily observable tie between
the spender (the firm) and the recipient (the politician or regulator).
The Article proceeds in two parts. Part I details why firms shift to darker
channels of political engagement. It provides new and needed empirical details
about the hydraulics of corporate political activity. We begin by cataloguing the
tactics of corporate political activity and detailing the underlying variance in the
traceability of the dominant tactics in firms’ political repertoires. We then
describe two empirical investigations into how corporate reputation drives firms
and campaigns to interact through darker (less traceable) tactics. The first
demonstrates that firms adjust their political spending to favor less traceable
political tactics as their reputation falls. The second demonstrates that campaigns
are more likely to obfuscate the employer of CEOs that represent less reputable
firms. Together, these studies support our claim that political spending tends to
flow through less traceable channels as a firm’s reputation falls.
Part II uses these empirical findings to interrogate the relationship between
traceability mandates of money in politics and theories of the First Amendment.
While the Supreme Court has prominently struck down restrictions on money in
politics in cases such as Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,30 it
has repeatedly upheld a variety of disclosure requirements. The Court has said,
for example, that disclosure requirements are less constitutionally problematic
than restrictions on political spending because disclosures “may burden the
ability to speak, but they ‘impose no ceiling on campaign-related activities,’ . . .
and ‘do not prevent anyone from speaking.’”31 Transparency, the Court has
explained, helps citizens “make informed choices in the political marketplace”32
and can deter donors from “hiding behind dubious and misleading names.”33
29

See infra Part I.C.3.
558 U.S. 310 (2010).
31
Id. at 366 (citation omitted) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) and McConnell v. Fed.
Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 201 (2003)).
32
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 197 (citation omitted).
33
Id.
30
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The Court’s support for mandated disclosures, however, is changing. At the
same time, in part because the courts have so aggressively struck down
substantive campaign finance regulations, policy makers are increasingly
turning to disclosures, which have in turn become a growing target of First
Amendment litigation. In Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta, the
Court held facially unconstitutional a California law that required non-profit
organizations to disclose their major donors to state officials.34 In so doing, the
Court both increased the “exacting scrutiny” that has typically applied to
politics-related disclosures and expanded the scope of the types of disclosures
subject to narrow tailoring.35 How far will the Court extend exacting scrutiny or
the narrow tailoring requirement? To mandated disclosures about the political
activity of for-profit corporations? To disclosure requirements outside of the
donor or political sphere? To intermediate scrutiny more broadly? We will have
to wait and see. Regardless, Justice Sotomayor’s comment in her dissent that the
decision “marks reporting and disclosure requirements with a bull’s-eye”
appears apt.36 And as E.J. Dionne observed in response to the decision, “the
world of dark-money politics is poised to become darker still.”37 These
developments make it ever more important to assess and theorize the
justifications for campaign finance related disclosures.
Responding to this need, our research suggests an empirically grounded
justification for traceability mandates that is consonant with the deep logic of
the First Amendment: traceability alters politicians’ behavior, causing them to
act more consistently with public opinion. Traceability mandates make
politicians more accountable to the people in the very way that the Supreme
Court has maintained that, in an objective sense, “[s]peech is an essential
mechanism of democracy, for it is the means to hold officials accountable to the
people.”38 Moreover, our data demonstrates that this accountability operates
through politician, rather than donor, action—thus decreasing fears of chilling
donor speech. At the same time, we document evidence that traceability policies,
and the reduction of darker corporate money in politics they produce, promote
the public’s belief that their views shape the political system in the subjective

34

141 S. Ct. 2373, 2389 (2021).
The Court held that “exacting scrutiny” now requires not only a “substantial relation” between the
mandated disclosure and a “sufficiently important governmental interest,” as it has historically, but also “narrow
tailoring.” Id. at 2383; see Elizabeth Pollman, The Supreme Court and the Pro-Business Paradox, 135 HARV. L.
REV. 220, 224, 229–33 (2021).
36
Ams. for Prosperity Found., 141 S. Ct. at 2392 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
37
E.J. Dionne, Jr., Oligarchy Day at the Supreme Court, WASH. POST (July 1, 2021, 5:51 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/07/01/oligarchy-day-supreme-court/.
38
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010).
35
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sense that Robert Post has theorized acts as the basis of the First Amendment’s
democratic purpose.39
Traceability mandates, in short, advance both objective and subjective forms
of democratic accountability. We therefore argue that such policies not only
further core First Amendment values but also should be required by the First
Amendment itself. By connecting empirical research to First Amendment
theory, we hope to expand the scope of reasonable views of what the freedom of
speech allows and requires—or, in the words of Jack Balkin, to broaden what
counts as “on-the-wall” interpretations of the reach and meaning of the Speech
Clause.40
This Article additionally brings empirical work to bear on central questions
of the growing literature on law and political economy41 and the First
Amendment’s libertarian turn.42 In Part II.A, we focus First Amendment theory

39

ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION 62 (2014).
JACK BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST WORLD 179–82 (2011).
41
See supra note 18; K. Sabeel Rahman, The New Utilities: Private Power, Social Infrastructure, and
the Revival of the Public Utility Concept, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1621, 1672–73, 1687 (2018); Lina M. Khan,
Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 716–17 (2017); Sitaraman, The Puzzling Absence of Economic
Power in Constitutional Theory, supra note 18, at 1447–55; Kate Andrias, Separations of Wealth: Inequality
and the Erosion of Checks and Balances, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 419, 421–23 (2015); Kate Andrias, An American
Approach to Social Democracy: The Forgotten Promise of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 128 YALE L.J. 616,
619–30 (2019); JON D. MICHAELS, CONSTITUTIONAL COUP: PRIVATIZATION’S THREAT TO THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 119–41 (2017).
42
See, e.g., Jedediah Purdy, Beyond the Bosses’ Constitution: The First Amendment and Class
Entrenchment, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2161, 2165–66 (2018); Amy Kapczynski, The Lochnerized First
Amendment and the FDA: Toward a More Democratic Political Economy, 118 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 179,
182 (2018); Morgan N. Weiland, Expanding the Periphery and Threatening the Core: The Ascendant
Libertarian Speech Tradition, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1392–93 (2017); Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner,
2016 WIS. L. REV. 133, 139–40 (2016); Genevieve Lakier, Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona, and the Rise of
the Anticlassificatory First Amendment, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 233, 235–36 (2016); Robert Post & Amanda
Shanor, Adam Smith’s First Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 165, 166–67 (2015); Rebecca Tushnet, The First
Amendment Walks into a Bar: Trademark Registration and Free Speech, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 381, 382
(2016); Leslie Kendrick, First Amendment Expansionism, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1199, 1218 (2015); Julie E.
Cohen, The Zombie First Amendment, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1119, 1120 (2015); Coates, supra note 17, at
223–24; Elizabeth Sepper, Free Exercise Lochnerism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1453, 1464 (2015); Jedediah Purdy,
Neoliberal Constitutionalism: Lochnerism for a New Economy, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195, 208 (2014);
Tamara R. Piety, Commentary, Citizens United and the Threat to the Regulatory State, 109 MICH. L. REV. FIRST
IMPRESSIONS 16, 22 (2010); Tim Wu, The Right to Evade Regulation: How Corporations Hijacked the First
Amendment, NEW REPUBLIC (June 3, 2013), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/113294/how-corporationshijacked-firstamendmentevade-regulation. For important early work, see Thomas H. Jackson & John Calvin
Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1979);
Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1386–88 (1984); J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About
Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 378–79 (1990); Frederick
Schauer, The Political Incidence of the Free Speech Principle, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 935, 955 (1993). But see
Jane R. Bambauer & Derek E. Bambauer, Information Libertarianism, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 335, 354 (2017)
40
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on questions of economic power and develop a theory of how the First
Amendment might be reconceived to further democratic and egalitarian ends,
acting not only as a right from government intervention but also as a right to
accountable democratic government.
Part II.B provides concrete policy reforms that would increase the
traceability of corporate political activity, including strengthening existing
lobbying disclosures by requiring a firm to identify the specific legislators and
regulators that it meets with, as well as enhancing campaign finance disclosures
for key individuals associated with the firm by requiring these individuals to
include a standard firm identifier in their individual-level disclosures. We
additionally recommend that firms be required to disclose their contributions to
non-profit 501(c) corporations, so as to put an end to truly dark corporate money.
We conclude that adopting reforms to increase the traceability of corporate
political activity would further the First Amendment goal of ensuring public
officials are accountable to the people.
I.

WHY FIRMS SHIFT TO DARKER MONEY: THE EMPIRICS OF CORPORATE
POLITICAL ACTIVITY

To engage their political environments, firms draw upon a rich tactical
repertoire, including campaign contributions, lobbying, and grassroots
mobilization. We begin this Part by describing firm strategies and detailing the
disclosure regimes governing each in order to illustrate how they vary in terms
of traceability. Next, we present our theoretical argument as to why corporate
reputation drives firms toward less traceable options for political engagement.
We end this section with a set of empirical investigations that test our arguments.
A. Unpacking the Repertoire of Corporate Political Activity
Amy Hillman and Michael Hitt have described firms’ corporate political
activity as comprised of three underlying “generic” strategies: financial,
informational, and constituency.43 The first category, financial strategies, occurs
when firms build connections to public policymakers by hiring former
politicians or by providing assistance to active politicians’ electoral

(arguing in favor of forms of First Amendment libertarianism); Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L.
REV. 57, 60–61 (2014).
43
Amy J. Hillman & Michael A. Hitt, Corporate Political Strategy Formulation: A Model of Approach,
Participation, and Strategy Decisions, 24 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 825, 834–35 (1999).
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campaigns.44 The best-known vehicle for financial corporate political activity is
the corporate-linked PAC. PACs deploy funds that are segregated from the
corporate treasury to support political agendas by making contributions to
political candidates or parties.45 Firms can create and control the giving of a
PAC, which typically takes the firm’s name (for example, the Exxon Mobil
Corporation Political Action Committee), as well as pay its operating costs, but
firms are not allowed to contribute treasury resources directly to the PAC.46
Rather, firm-linked PACs can only raise funds from a restricted class of
individuals related to the firm such as executives, managers, shareholders, and
their families.47 PACs can contribute up to $5,000 per candidate per election and
face no limit on their overall giving.48 PACs can also contribute similarly limited
amounts to political parties and other political committees aiming to influence
electoral outcomes.49
Since January 2010, as a result of Citizens United, firms have been able to
use money from their treasuries to make independent political expenditures and
donate to committees—including “Super PACs” and 501(c) non-profit
organizations—that make independent political expenditures.50 If a firm donates
to a 501(c) organization, such as a 501(c)(6) trade association, disclosure of the
firm’s contribution is only required if specifically earmarked for electoral
activity.51 By allowing this extremely covert form of financial engagement, in
which traceability is effectively eliminated, Citizens United produced truly dark
corporate money in the electoral context.52
The second generic category of corporate political activity, informational
strategies, principally revolves around the lobbying of government officials,
including legislators and regulators. Lobbying is the process by which firms
share policy and politically relevant information with officials to encourage
them to take actions consistent with the firms’ goals. Prior research highlights
the strategic value of lobbying by evincing its association with stronger
accounting-based measures of firm performance and awarded government
contracts.53 There are no limits on the amount firms can spend on lobbying and,
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53

Id.
See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 321 (2010).
52 U.S.C. § 30118 (2002).
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 321.
52 U.S.C. § 30116 (2002).
Id.
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365.
Werner, supra note 13, at 2429.
For further discussion on the use and value of this tactic, see id. at 2432, 2439.
Matthew D. Hill, G. Wayne Kelly, G. Brandon Lockhart & Robert A. Van Ness, Determinants and
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as we discuss below, the disclosure regime governing lobbying is quite weak
compared to campaign contributions.
The third and final category of corporate political action, constituency
strategies, involves firms exploiting connections between their operations and
public policymakers’ electoral constituencies.54 For example, firms can leverage
geographic coverage of electoral districts through the location of plants and
employees in an attempt to gain influence over policymakers.55 Firms can also
engage in “astroturfing,” wherein they hire public relations firms to assist in the
construction of a grassroots campaign to lobby public policymakers indirectly
through ostensibly disinterested citizens or shell corporations.56 In general,
constituency-based political strategies are far less regulated than either financial
or informational strategies. Firms can spend unlimited amounts from their
treasuries on such campaigns, which tend to be expensive (limiting their
attractiveness as a tactic). Firms are not obligated to disclose either their
engagement in these activities or the amount they spend. Thus, these campaigns,
like trade association activity, can be extremely difficult to observe and trace.57
Firms can also engage in politics individually or collectively.58 On this front,
we recognize that less reputable firms might shift to more collective
informational lobbying via an industry trade association (a 501(c)(6) business
league) or on ad hoc coalition to limit the traceability of their political activity.
Much like the “dark money” created by Citizens United, as well as constituency
strategies, shifts toward collective strategies are so untraceable as to be
unobservable. That is to say, regulations of corporate political action neither
require firms to disclose formal or informal coalitions they join nor require trade
associations to report their members.
Effects of Corporate Lobbying, 42 FIN. MGMT. 931, 933, 944 (2013); see also Ridge et al., supra note 23, at
1140–42 (finding that lobbying assists in the procurement of government contracts).
54
Hillman & Hitt, supra note 43, at 834–35.
55
See, e.g., ALEX HERTEL-FERNANDEZ, POLITICS AT WORK: HOW COMPANIES TURN THEIR WORKERS
INTO LOBBYISTS 18–20 (2018); Matilde Bombardini & Francesco Trebbi, Votes or Money? Theory and Evidence
from the US Congress, 95 J. PUB. ECON. 587, 588 (2011); Barry D. Baysinger, Gerald D. Keim & Carl P.
Zeithaml, An Empirical Evaluation of the Potential for Including Shareholders in Corporate Constituency
Programs, 28 ACAD. MGMT. J. 180, 184–85, 197 (1985).
56
Lyon & Maxwell, supra note 23, at 563; WALKER, supra note 23, at 108–22; Melissa J. Durkee,
Astroturf Activism, 69 STAN. L. REV. 201, 203–04 (2017).
57
It is not possible to systematically examine constituency-based strategies since they are not subject to
disclosure. However, due to their costs (whether moving facilities or employees to relevant constituencies or
building a grassroots organization with the aid of a public relations consultancy), we believe that they are
employed more as a tactic of last resort than a regular form of core political action. For information on the
characteristics of firms that employ grassroots campaigns, as well as information on the effectiveness and costs
of these campaigns, see WALKER, supra note 23.
58
See Hillman & Hitt, supra note 43, at 831.

SMCW_12.15.21

2021]

12/16/2021 10:24 AM

CORPORATE POLITICAL POWER

169

However, in the U.S. context, it is important to note that collective forms of
political engagement are unlikely to play a central role in firms’ political
repertoire for three reasons. First, the vast majority of corporate political action
occurs at the firm level and not the industry level.59 Second, most trade
associations are composed of market rivals, limiting their ability to “speak with
one voice” politically.60 And third, most industry-level trade associations do not
focus on political activity.61
B. The Role of Corporate Reputation in the Selection of Political Tactics
Research has to date been largely agnostic about how firms select between
the different forms of political activity available to them. Instead, research
typically defers to an assumption that a firm is free, within the limits of the law
and the demands of market and nonmarket competition, to select which tactics
to employ and the degree of resources to dedicate to each according to its own
strategic needs and priorities.62 We argue, however, that this understanding of
corporate political strategy overestimates the degree of agency and latitude that
many firms enjoy. An emerging body of work suggests that political access and
influence disproportionately accrue to firms with a strong reputation, defined
here as the public’s general perception of a firm’s social performance. For
example, Timothy Werner has empirically demonstrated that firms with better
reputations are more likely to be invited to participate in the policymaking
process by giving testimony in Congressional hearings.63 And Caroline Flammer

59
Frank R. Baumgartner & Beth L. Leech, Interest Niches and Policy Bandwagons: Patterns of Interest
Group Involvement in National Politics, 63 J. POL. 1191, 1194–95, 1197 (2001).
60
See Michael L. Barnett, One Voice, But Whose Voice? Exploring What Drives Trade Association
Activity, 52 BUS. & SOC’Y 213, 214 (2012).
61
See LYN SPILLMAN, SOLIDARITY IN STRATEGY: MAKING BUSINESS MEANINGFUL IN AMERICAN TRADE
ASSOCIATIONS 195 (2012). Umbrella groups, such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce or the National Small
Business Association, are active and influential both in politics and constitutional litigation and have been for
decades. See, e.g., Shanor, supra note 42, at 144, 158 (discussing the role of umbrella groups in First Amendment
litigation); ALYSSA KATZ, THE INFLUENCE MACHINE: THE U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND THE CORPORATE
CAPTURE OF AMERICAN LIFE (2015); Confidential Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Eugene B. Sydnor,
Jr., Chairman, U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Aug. 23, 1971), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/
powellmemo/1; Joan Biskupic, Janet Roberts & John Shiffman, The Echo Chamber: A Small Group of Lawyers
and Its Outsized Influence at the U.S. Supreme Court, REUTERS INVESTIGATES (Dec. 8, 2014), https://www.
reuters.com/investigates/special-report/scotus/. Their relative share of business political activity, however, is
smaller than that of firms in aggregate. See generally OPENSECRETS, infra note 93 (presenting collected data on
the contributions of various groups to PACs and lobbying, including those made by trade associations).
62
See, e.g., Jean Philippe Bonardi, Amy Hillman & Gerald Keim, The Attractiveness of Political Markets:
Implications for Firm Strategy, 30 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 397, (2005).
63
Timothy Werner, Gaining Access by Doing Good: The Effect of Sociopolitical Reputation on Firm
Participation in Public Policymaking, 61 MGMT. SCI. 1989, 1996, 2008 (2015); see also Heli Wang & Cuili
Qian, Corporate Philanthropy and Corporate Financial Performance: The Roles of Stakeholder Response and
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offers complementary evidence that reputable firms are systematically given
preference in the federal government’s allocation of procurement contracts, a
critical source of income for many firms.64
Other recent research suggests that events that bring an organization’s
reputation into question can constrain targeted firms’ engagement in politics
because of politicians’ reticence to associate with a compromised firm.
Evidencing this, Mary-Hunter McDonnell and Timothy Werner have
demonstrated that firms that experience a reputational shock in the form of a
consumer boycott are less likely to be awarded government procurement
contracts or invited to participate in congressional hearings.65 They argue that
politicians become less receptive to firms experiencing reputational threats
because of an increase in perceived associative risk, or the “politicians’
perceived likelihood of accruing incidental damage by virtue of their mere
association” to the compromised firm.66
Taken together, this research suggests that the political marketplace is more
constrained for less reputable firms. Political stakeholders are warier to associate
with these firms because of perceived associative risk, or the risk that the
politician’s own reputation and prospects could suffer through an open
association. The operative mechanism at play, stigma by association, is
supported by a broad body of research demonstrating that stigma can travel
through social networks, producing adverse effects for actors who are connected
to a compromised organization, regardless of their innocence or complicity.67
Critically, however, the spread of stigma by association depends on an
association being open and observable. Accordingly, to avoid stigma by
association, actors endeavor to limit their overt associations with disreputable
entities, eschewing affiliations with entities deemed deviant or illegitimate. In
Political Access, 54 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1159, 1150, 1178 (2011) (providing evidence in a sample of Chinese firms
that philanthropic activities translate to greater performance benefits for firms that have a greater need for
political support, implying that enhanced public approval engendered by corporate charity affords firms with
greater access to political resources they require for superior performance).
64
Caroline Flammer, Competing for Government Procurement Contracts: The Role of Corporate Social
Responsibility, 39 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1299, 1316–17 (2018).
65
Mary-Hunter McDonnell & Timothy Werner, Blacklisted Businesses: Social Activists’ Challenges and
the Disruption of Corporate Political Activity, 61 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 584, 586–87 (2016).
66
Id. at 587.
67
See, e.g., Stefan Jonsson, Henrich R. Greve & Takako Fujiwara-Greve, Undeserved Loss: The Spread
of Legitimacy Loss to Innocent Organizations in Response to Reported Corporate Deviance, 54 ADMIN. SCI. Q.
195, 223–24 (2009); Mary-Hunter McDonnell, Kate Odziemkowska & Elizabeth Pontikes, Bad Company: Shifts
in Social Activists’ Tactics and Resources after Industry Crises, 32 ORG. SCI. 1033, 1034, 1047 (2021) (finding
that NGOs that had openly collaborated with British Petroleum prior to the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill
suffered from significantly decreased contributions after the spill).
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the context of corporate political activity, politicians’ demonstrated preference
for associations with reputable firms is, we contend, an instantiation of this
broader phenomenon.
In theorizing how firms might strategize around reputational constraints on
their political strategies, we begin with the assumption that, all else equal, firms
would like to engage in overt, traceable forms of political activity, either for
benefits gained from these tactics on their own or because these tactics can
augment the effectiveness of more indirect forms of political activity.68
Traceable political activity is beneficial on its own because, by demonstrating a
firm’s clear linkage to political stakeholders, it sends valuable signals to political
and market participants. For example, political science research shows that
disclosed campaign contributions produce greater access to legislators.69
Corporate political activity that creates a readily observable tie between a firm
and a politician or party also demonstrates to the market that political
stakeholders are willing to openly engage with the firm, providing a valuable
signal of the firm’s capability to minimize political risk. Evidencing this, one
study found that financial market participants bid up the share prices of firms
that support Congressional candidates via their PACs.70
Traceable corporate political activity is also valuable insofar as it may
augment the efficacy of other tactics. For example, campaign contributions are
recognized to function as an entry fee that opens the doors necessary for the
effective administration of less traceable tactics like lobbying.71 Further,
68
We focus on the benefits of traceable political activity from the firm’s perspective. From the politician’s
perspective, all else equal, traceable corporate political action is also preferred for two reasons. First,
contributions to the politicians’ campaign coffers are under the control of his or her campaign and not that of a
third party. Second, spending from a politician’s own campaign account on political advertising goes further
than that from a third party, as media companies are required to sell airtime to a candidate at the lowest available
rate but are allowed to charge third-party actors whatever they choose. See Melissa Yeager, The High Cost of
Television Ads for Super PACs, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Dec. 22, 2015, 2:52 PM), https://sunlightfoundation.com/
2015/12/22/the-high-cost-of-television-ads-for-super-pac/.
69
Joshua L. Kalla & David E. Broockman, Campaign Contributions Facilitate Access to Congressional
Officials: A Randomized Field Experiment, 60 AM. J. POL. SCI. 545, 554 (2016); see also Richard L. Hall &
Frank W. Wayman, Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees,
84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 797, 810 (1990) (finding that legislators pay increased attention to their contributors’
priorities).
70
Michael J. Cooper, Huseyin Gulen & Alexei V. Ovtchinnikov, Corporate Political Contributions and
Stock Returns, 65 J. FIN. 687, 718–19 (2010); see also Pat Akey, Valuing Changes in Political Networks:
Evidence from Campaign Contributions to Close Congressional Elections, 28 REV. FIN. STUD. 3188, 3190
(2015) (finding, in a regression discontinuity design employed on a sample of close, off-cycle congressional
elections, that firms that supported winning candidates through PAC contributions experienced a three percent
higher abnormal return than those that had backed the losers).
71
Gerald Keim & Asghar Zardkoohi, Looking for Leverage in PAC Markets: Corporate and Labor
Contributions Considered, 58 PUB. CHOICE 21, 21–28 (1988).
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traceable tactics provide the firm with optimal control over its political strategy,
in contrast to tactics that involve third parties such as social welfare
organizations, trade associations, or so-called “Super PACs,” all of which
introduce limits on firm-level control of political spending.72
While we see traceable forms of corporate political activity as most
beneficial to firms, we expect that these tactics are less available to disreputable
firms, given politicians’ reticence to associate with them. Instead, to the degree
that politicians will engage with such firms, it will be through less traceable
forms of political activity that allow for the obfuscation of the politician or party
being influenced. Given varying disclosure requirements, the tactics within a
firm’s political repertoire vary considerably in their traceability, or the extent to
which they produce observable ties between the firm and the politicians or
parties it seeks to support and influence. Tactics that do not create an observable
tie between a firm and a particular politician or political party are “darker” in the
sense that they obfuscate relationships between firms and the politicians with
whom they associate, ameliorating the associative risks involved in the
interaction. Politicians are likely to be more open to interacting with a less
reputable firm through tactics that do not publicly tie them to the firm. We
therefore hypothesized that firms with weaker reputations will favor less
traceable forms of political activity.
In testing this hypothesis, we assume that, to some degree, more covert forms
of corporate political activity (i.e., lobbying) can act as a substitute for, not just
as a complement to, more overt forms of political action (i.e., campaign
contributions). Although lobbying is typically viewed as the provision of
information to incumbent legislators designed to shape public policy outcomes,
much of the information shared with these incumbents is relevant to politics and
not just policy.73 As the co-editor of the American Bar Association’s Lobbying
Manual notes, this politically relevant information can include the results of
research reports and public opinion polling related to the political consequences
of different policy options,74 and theoretical models of the lobbying process view
this information as a part of a “legislative subsidy” or a “matching grant of costly

72

Barnett, supra note 60; Werner, supra note 13, at 2430–31.
ANTHONY J. NOWNES, TOTAL LOBBYING: WHAT LOBBYISTS WANT (AND HOW THEY TRY TO GET IT)
26–28 (2006); FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER, JEFFREY M. BERRY, MARIE HOJNACKI, DAVID C. KIMBALL & BETH L.
LEECH, LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE: WHO WINS, WHO LOSES, AND WHY 124 (2009).
74
Thomas M. Susman, Private Ethics, Public Conduct: An Essay on Ethical Lobbying, Campaign
Contributions, Reciprocity, and the Public Good, 19 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 10, 11–12 (2008); see THE
LOBBYING MANUAL: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO FEDERAL LOBBYING LAW AND PRACTICE (Rebecca H. Gordon &
Thomas M. Susman eds., 5th ed. 2016) (noting Thomas M. Susman as a co-editor).
73
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policy information, political intelligence, and labor to the enterprises of
strategically selected legislators.”75 Importantly, historical research on the farm
lobby reveals that politically relevant information provided interest groups with
a competitive advantage in terms of drawing legislators’ attention that they could
not gain with policy relevant information alone.76 And, as Cary Coglianese and
Alex Acs argue, business groups can employ the provision of political
information, as opposed to policy information, to persuade via intimidation even
unelected policymakers to enact policies friendly to firms.77 Finally, recent
empirical work suggests that when firms hit the statutory caps on campaign
contributions from their affiliated PACs, large spillovers occur into other forms
of political activity, including lobbying.78
C. Testing the Proposition That as a Firm’s Reputation Falls, It Will Shift
Towards Darker, Less Traceable Political Tactics
In the section that follows, we elaborate on the variation in the traceability
of the two dominant tactics in firms’ political repertoire: PAC contributions and
lobbying. Though firms have a number of other, less traceable forms of political
activity available to them post-Citizens United, we focus on the pre-Citizens
United period when these two systematically observable tactics were the primary
ones available to firms. Rather than presenting a limit on our analysis, this time
restriction allows us to make more solid inferences with regard to firms’
behavior, as there are no truly dark or completely untraceable electoral tactics
that we are unable to observe prior to 2010.
1. Variance in the Traceability of Common Political Tactics
Corporate PAC contributions, compared to lobbying, are subject to a more
stringent disclosure regime. The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and its
1976 Amendments govern PACs and set their contribution limits.79 The names
and occupations of all individuals who contribute more than $200 in a year to a
75
Richard L. Hall & Alan V. Deardorff, Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy, 100 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 69, 69
(2006) (emphasis added).
76
See JOHN MARK HANSEN, GAINING ACCESS: CONGRESS AND THE FARM LOBBY, 1919-1981, at 13–17
(Benjamin I. Paige ed.,1991).
77
Cary Coglianese & Alex Acs, Influence Through Intimidation: Evidence from Business Lobbying and
the Regulatory Process 4 (July 19, 2021) (unpublished manuscript) (on file at Penn Law: Legal Scholarship
Repository).
78
Adam Fremeth, Brian Kelleher Richter & Brandon Schaufele, Spillovers from Regulating Corporate
Campaign Contributions, 54 J. REG. ECON. 244, 245, 247 (2018).
79
Fed. Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92–225, 86 Stat. § 302 (1972); Fed. Election
Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94–283, 90 Stat. 486 § 112 (1976).
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PAC (along with their total contribution amount) must be disclosed quarterly to
the Federal Election Commission (FEC), and PACs must also report all of their
contributions.80 Although funds for corporate PACs must be raised from a
restricted class of individual donors with ties to the firm, the PAC, once funded,
takes on the corporate organizational identity, and PAC officers who are
determined by the firm have full control over which candidates and party
organizations receive its contributions.81 Information about which politicians
and party groups receive which firm-affiliated PAC contributions is publicly
available through the FEC.82
As a result of this fairly stringent disclosure regime, PAC contributions forge
especially clear ties between firms and the politicians they seek to influence.
PAC contributions are also often taken by critics to imply some degree of actual
influence, insofar as they are perceived to establish a quid pro quo relationship
between a firm and a political candidate.83 For example, Senate Majority Leader
Mitch McConnell’s most significant campaign contributor is AT&T.84 When
McConnell cast his vote in favor of a landmark telecommunications
deregulation bill, pro-democracy organization Common Cause protested by
pointing to AT&T’s political support as evidence that the industry was “‘buying’
the legislation.”85 Because PAC contributions create such clear links between
companies and the individual politicians who they support, we expect PAC
contributions to be especially conducive to stigma-by-association, making them
less available to firms with compromised reputations.
Compared to PAC contributions, lobbying efforts are subject to a disclosure
framework that reflects a relative lack of transparency and traceability. Since
1995, lobbyists have been required to disclose information such as their
employer, the identity of their clients (if different from their employer), how
much their clients spend in the aggregate (if more than $10,000), and the general
target and objective of their lobbying efforts.86 However, lobbyists tend to
80
Individual Contributions: Reporting on Candidate Forms, U.S. FED. ELECTION COMM’N, https://www.
fec.gov/help-candidates-and-committees/filing-reports/individual-contributions/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2021).
81
See Fed. Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92–225, 86 Stat. § 302 (1972) (governing the
organization of political committees).
82
See Committees, U.S. FED. ELECTION COMM’N, https://www.fec.gov/data/browse-data/?tab=
committees (last visited Nov. 16, 2021).
83
See Randall Kroszner & Thomas S. Stratmann, Congressional Committees as Reputation-Building
Mechanisms, 2 BUS. & POL. 35, 36–37 (2000).
84
Josh Israel, Aaron Mehta & Caitlin Ginley, Mitch McConnell: Fueled by Tobacco and Whiskey, CTR.
FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (May 19, 2014, 12:19 PM), https://www.publicintegrity.org/2010/06/08/4016/mitch-mcconnellfueled-tobacco-and-whiskey.
85
Id.
86
Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104–65 109 Stat. 691 § 4.
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disclose this information in extremely simplistic terms (for example, “target:
U.S. Senate; issue: tax”), such that it is virtually impossible to pinpoint with
certainty the specific politicians with whom firms are interacting through
lobbying.87 Thus, the disclosures identifying which politicians the firms are
lobbying and what specific issues or policy provisions they are pursuing is far
from transparent.
The regulatory structure for lobbying makes it less traceable. While one can
ascertain which firms are attempting to influence political constituencies, given
they must report total monies spent, lobbying does not establish observable
connections between a firm and the specific politicians it is attempting to
influence. We accordingly anticipated that politicians would be more receptive
to engaging with less reputable firms via lobbying than campaign finance,
especially given that politicians may still benefit from hearing policy and
politically relevant information from less reputable firms.88 At the same time,
more reputable firms may have less need for lobbying given that they can make
campaign contributions without tarring politicians via guilt by association and
are endowed with greater opportunities to share policy-relevant information
through open channels, such as invited appearances in Congressional hearings.89
Applying our primary hypothesis to firms’ selection from among their two most
fundamental tactics of political action, we accordingly expected that as a firm’s
reputation increases, it will rely less heavily on lobbying as compared to PAC
contributions, and vice versa.
2. Study 1: The Relationship Between Corporate Reputation and the
Traceability of Political Activity
We began exploring the relationship between corporate reputation and the
traceability of political activity using a longitudinal panel that tracked all
members of the S&P 500 from 1999 to 2009. This sample includes a diverse
representation of the largest firms within different major industries in the United
States. Members of the S&P 500 are leaders within their respective fields and
tend to be publicized heavily by the media, such that they have attained the level
of public recognition necessary for reputation to be meaningful. Our sample
period is informed by data limitations. We began the panel in 1999 because firm87
For example, in a fourth quarter 2019 lobbying report, Alpine Group Partners, LLC reported receiving
an income of $30,000 from Facebook, Inc. to lobby the “U.S. Senate [and] U.S. House of Representatives” on
“spectrum issues.” Lobbying Report from Alpine Group Inc. (2019) (on file with the Clerk of the U.S. H.R.),
https://disclosurespreview.house.gov/ld/ldxmlrelease/2019/4A/301129950.xml.
88
NOWNES, supra note 73, at 26–28.
89
Werner, supra note 63, at 1992, 1996.
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level lobbying expenditures were not reliably reported prior to 1998 due to the
passage of the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) in 1995.90 We ended our panel
in 2009 because the data source we used to construct our measure of
reputation—the Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini & Co. (KLD) Statistical Tool for
Analysis of Trends (STATS) ratings—underwent a significant reformation of its
reporting and measurement practices in 2010.
In 2010, Citizens United introduced a significant shock to corporate political
activity by opening up the availability of a number of previously illegal, covert
pathways to political influence. Most importantly, firms can now make
unlimited, untraceable, and indirect expenditures to political campaigns through
501(c) organizations. Ending our sample period prior to the passage of Citizens
United allows us to examine the relative traceability of firms’ political activities
during a period in which their primary electoral tactics were systematically
observable. As we discuss below, by analyzing two significant accidental
disclosures of secret corporate donations—to the American Legislative
Exchange Council in 2011 and the Republican Governors Association in 2014—
we were able to test whether the findings we observed for systematically
observable tactics from 1999 to 2009 are likely to apply to dark corporate money
after Citizens United.
a. Dependent Variable: Tactical Traceability
The data for our dependent variable come from two sources. First, data on
campaign contributions come from the FEC, which collects transaction-level
data on contributions to federal elections in the United States.91 Second, data on
lobbying are sourced from the Center for Responsive Politics’ OpenSecrets
database, which collects information from mandatory lobbying disclosures filed
with the U.S. Senate and executive agencies.92
To determine firm PAC contributions, we hand-matched firms to their linked
PACs and then summed all the contributions made by the PAC in each year.
Although the FEC requires corporate-linked PACs to list the corporations they
are connected to, the FEC does not provide a link between their data sets and
any standard unique firm identifier. In the few cases in which a firm had multiple
linked PACs, we aggregated contributions across all these PACs in each year.
We collected data on lobbying by similarly hand-matching OpenSecrets’s
lobbying data to the firms in our sample.
90
91
92

See id. at 1995.
See U.S. FED. ELECTION COMM’N, http://www.fec.gov (last visited Nov. 16, 2021).
See OPENSECRETS, http://www.OpenSecrets.org (last visited Nov. 16, 2021).
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Our dependent variable approximates firms’ balancing of more and less
traceable political tactics by examining each firm’s relative reliance on PAC
contributions (which are more traceable) as compared to lobbying expenditures
(which are less traceable). The variable is constructed as total annual PAC
contributions divided by the sum of annual PAC contributions and annual
lobbying expenditures. Given the construction of our dependent variable, our
model excludes firm-years in which a firm had no reported political activity in
terms of either PAC contributions or lobbying (n=381, comprising roughly 15%
of firm-years in the sample for which data is otherwise complete).
To provide more context around our dependent variable, it is instructive to
consider trends in firms’ historic balance of lobbying and PAC contributions
within their overall strategic implementation of political action. Below, Figure
1 depicts historic trends in the traceability of the political activity of our sample
members across the full period of our study. The figure also depicts trends in
public approval of big business, as reported in Gallup’s annual poll measuring
confidence in institutions.
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Figure 1. Historical Trends in the Proportion of Traceable Corporate Political
Activity (CPA) Employed by the S&P 500, and General Public Confidence
in Business93

As the figure shows, firms have always spent more money on lobbying
relative to PAC contributions. In Figure 1, the Proportion Traceable CPA line
captures the proportion of traceable political activity (lobbying and PAC
contributions) that comprised of PAC contributions. That line reaches its peak
in the figure in 2001, at a proportion of traceable CPA of just over 0.3, at which
point lobbying expenditures would be just under 0.7. However, the emphasis on
lobbying in the average firm’s political portfolio has increased over time,
suggesting a general trend toward less traceable political activity. In 2009, at the
end of the decade of data tracked in the figure, the Proportion Traceable CPA
was just under 0.15, indicating that the approximate remaining 0.85 was spent
on lobbying. This trend corresponds closely with falling levels of public
approval of business over the period of our study. These trends provide
93
Our sample only includes politically active firms that had observable lobbying or PAC expenditures in
a given year. The public confidence in business figures reflect the percentage of people who answered “Great
Deal” or “Quite a Lot” in the annual Gallup Poll of public confidence in big business. Confidence in Institutions,
GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1597/confidence-institutions.aspx (last visited Nov. 16, 2021).
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anecdotal evidence of our theory, insofar as we would expect political markets
to become less receptive to traceable corporate political activity as public
approval of business decreases.
Our proxy for traceability rests on an assumption that firms’ relative reliance
on lobbying versus PAC contributions—two tactics that vary in traceability and
can be observed—reliably corresponds with their likely reliance on less
traceable political tactics that cannot be observed (such as contributions made
through 501(c)(4) or 501(c)(6) non-profits or employee or constituency
campaigns). As a validity check of this assumption, we explored whether firms
that were recently exposed as contributors to 501(c) organizations post-Citizens
United did in fact vary significantly along our traceability measure. Using
recently published lists of accidental disclosures of corporations that had
secretly given to the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) in 2011
and Republican Governors Association (RGA) in 2014,94 we can compare
whether these truly “dark money” contributors also favored lobbying relative to
PAC contributions in their observable political expenditures.
In simple t-tests comparing the mean levels of our measure of traceability
across all public companies at the time of each of these incidents, we found that
non-contributors (those firms that were not exposed in the accidental disclosures
as employing dark money) had substantially higher levels of traceable political
activity. Disclosed sponsors of ALEC had a traceability score that was 50%
lower than non-sponsors (p=0.002); the traceability of disclosed RGA sponsors
was 32% lower than for non-sponsors (p=0.034).
These tests provide additional evidence that our proxy for the traceability of
corporate political activity is a valid indicator of firms’ reliance on truly dark
political action and that the measure has continuing validity in the post-Citizens
United era, when more options for truly dark corporate political action exist.
b. Independent Variables
Following prior research, we create a proxy for corporate reputation using
the annual domain-specific ratings reported in the KLD Statistical Tool for
Analysis of Trends (STATS).95 KLD is an independent social research firm that
94
Werner, supra note 13, at 2425 (listing RGA sponsors); Ishva Minefee, Mary-Hunter McDonnell &
Timothy Werner, Reexamining Investor Reaction to Corporate Political Activity: A Replication and Extension
of Werner (2017), 42 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1139, 1142 (2020) (noting ALEC sponsors).
95
See, e.g., Mary-Hunter McDonnell, Brayden G. King & Sarah A. Soule, A Dynamic Process Model of
Private Politics: Activist Targeting and Corporate Receptivity to Social Challenges, 80 AM. SOC. REV. 654, 663
(2015).
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relies on various internal and external sources, including corporate disclosures
and media reports, to assess and numerically score sampled firms’ performance
along seven social dimensions: (1) community, (2) corporate governance, (3)
diversity, (4) employee relations, (5) environment, (6) human rights, and (7)
product.96 This proxy aligns well with common conceptions of corporate
reputation as a construct rooted in generalized perceptions of a firm’s past
performance along various dimensions.97
Our proxy for a firm’s overall reputation is the net KLD score, constructed
by subtracting the total number of reported “concerns” for a firm in the seven
rated dimensions in a given year from the total number of reported “strengths.”
To separately assess the extent to which the relationship between reputation and
corporate political activity is driven by reputational concerns and reputational
strengths, we also run models that include the sum of concerns and strengths as
separate variables.98

96
MCSI, MSCI KLD 400 SOCIAL INDEX METHODOLOGY (May 2018), https://www.msci.com/eqb/
methodology/meth_docs/MSCI_KLD_400_Social_Index_Methodology_May2018.pdf.
97
See, e.g., Alex Bitektine, Toward a Theory of Social Judgments of Organizations: The Case of
Legitimacy, Reputation and Status, 36 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 151, 160–61 (2011); Brayden G. King & David A.
Whetten, Rethinking the Relationship Between Reputation and Legitimacy: A Social Actor Conceptualization,
11 CORP. REPUTATION REV. 192, 197 (2008); Donald Lange, Peggy M. Lee & Ye Dai, Organizational
Reputation: A Review, 37 J. MGMT. 153, 159 (2011).
We acknowledge that many critics raise concerns regarding KLD’s precision, subjectivity, and
transparency, as well as the use of individual subcategory ratings from the KLD database. See, e.g., Sana Shihchi
Chiu & Mark Sharfman, Legitimacy, Visibility, and the Antecedents of Corporate Social Performance: An
Investigation of the Instrumental Perspective, 37 J. MGMT. 1558, 1569–70 (2011); Aaron K. Chatterji, David I.
Levine & Michael W. Toffel, How Well Do Social Ratings Actually Measure Corporate Social Responsibility?,
18 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRAT. 125, 127 (2009). However, these criticisms focus on the use of KLD data as an
objective or precise measure of corporate social performance and not as a proxy measure of firm reputation
among stakeholders. KLD scores also have demonstrated practical relevance to a wide variety of non-market
strategic domains; evidence exists of (1) the ratings’ predictive power in understanding outcomes like the extent
of corporate political access, see Werner, supra note 63; (2) the severity of corporate punishment in civil
lawsuits, see Mary-Hunter McDonnell & Brayden G. King, Order in the Court: How Firm Status and Reputation
Shape the Outcomes of Employment Discrimination Suits, 83 AM. SOC. REV. 61, 63 (2018); and (3) the likelihood
of winning government procurement contracts, see Flammer, supra note 64. Compared to other commonly used
proxies for firms’ overall reputations (especially rankings based on Fortune’s most admired companies), our use
of KLD’s dataset (1) decreases the possibility that firms’ economic performances will dominate other
dimensions of their reputations, see Y. Sekou Bermiss, Edward J. Zajac & Brayden G. King, Under
Construction: How Commensuration and Management Fashion Affect Corporate Reputation Rankings, 25 ORG.
SCI. 591, 591–92 (2014); and (2) limits the mismatch that exists between intra-industry peers’ evaluations of
firms and the general public’s views of firms, see Brad Brown & Susan Perry, Removing the Financial
Performance Halo from Fortune’s “Most Admired” Companies, 37 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1347, 1350 (1994).
98
See Werner, supra note 63, at 1996; Caroline Flammer & Pratima Bansal, Does a Long-Term
Orientation Create Value? Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity, 38 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1827, 1834
(2017).
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c. Controls
Across all models, we include a battery of control variables that are likely to
be associated with the form or extent of a firm’s political activity. All variables
are lagged unless otherwise noted. First, insofar as traceable tactics are
dangerous because of their visibility, firms may be more likely to rely on less
traceable tactics when they are monitored more heavily by stakeholders, which
increases the likelihood that any visible corporate political activity will be
noticed. We account for this possibility by including separate proxies for public
attention and shareholder-specific monitoring. To capture the former, we control
for media prominence, which is the number of times the firm’s name appeared
in the headline or first paragraph of articles in the New York Times or Wall Street
Journal in a given year. To capture variance in shareholder attention to social
issues, we include the number of social-issue proxy proposals submitted at the
firm in a given year.99
The political tactics that a company uses are likely affected by the party that
it seeks to influence. Republicans are generally perceived as being friendlier to
business interests and may face less political ramifications for associating with
less reputable firms.100 This suggests that firms may face less constraints in using
traceable tactics to influence their legislative environment during periods in
which the government is more heavily controlled by Republicans. To control for
this possibility, we include a variable, Republican control, that is coded “0”
during years when Democrats controlled both the House and Senate, 0.5 during
years when the Republicans controlled either the House or Senate, and 1 during
years when the Republicans controlled both the House and Senate.
Politicians are more likely to be wary of the associative risk attached to
traceable corporate political activity during election years, when the adverse
electoral ramifications of an observable association with a compromised firm
are likely to be more salient and consequential. Accordingly, firms’ ability to
use traceable tactics may be more constrained during election years. We account
for this possibility with a binary control, election year, that is coded “1” during
years with regularly scheduled elections.

99
This variable is characterized by a natural lag because proxy proposals must be submitted to a firm 180
days in advance of its annual meeting (typically held in the first or second quarter of a calendar year).
Accordingly, we use the number of proposals that appear on the firm’s proxy in the same year as that in which
the dependent variable is measured.
100
McDonnell & Werner, supra note 66, at 601 (finding that boycotts result in a smaller increase in
refunded campaign contributions if they target firms that primarily support Republican candidates).
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We controlled for varying firm performance by including return on assets
(ROA). As proxies for corporate size, we include the logged number of
employees as well as logged assets. Associations with larger firms are likely to
be more visible, which might affect politicians’ receptivity to traceable tactics.
Controlling for the number of employees is especially important in this context
because, as members of the restricted class allowed to make contributions to a
firm’s PAC, employees represent the likeliest correlate with total campaign
contributions. Further, insofar as employees represent meaningful voting
constituencies, a firm’s employee base may serve as a proxy for a firm’s ability
to pursue a constituency strategy in lieu of either a financial or informational
strategy.101
Firms vary in the extent to which their performance is directly affected by
the formal political environment, as well as the extent to which they are at risk
of governmental intervention. Each of these considerations is likely to affect
whether firms engage in political activity and the likelihood that a firm will
respond to constraints on its political actions with tactical adjustments. We
control for this in two ways. First, we include a fixed effect for industry (using
the Fama-French 12 industry classification).102 Second, recognizing that firms
that sell goods or services to the government are more dependent on
governmental relationships, we include a binary control that is coded “1” if the
firm is among the top 100 federal contractors in a given year, as per the
government’s annual Federal Procurement Report.103
Companies are generally creatures of strategic habit and routine, so a firm’s
present political tactics are, in part, a function of the tactics it has historically
favored. To account for this, we include controls capturing the firm’s previous
PAC contributions and lobbying expenditures, averaged across the prior three
years. Finally, to account for systematic temporal patterns in giving across years
that result from the increasing cost of lobbying and elections (and legal changes
to contribution limits), we include fixed effects for each year. The inclusion of
annual fixed effects also helps to account for unobserved shifts in perceptions of
corporate social responsibility that might affect the construction of KLD’s
reputation scoring system over time.

101
See Bombardini & Trebbi, supra note 55, at 588 (describing the relationship between campaign
contributions and “the number of employees [with]in a [given] sector”).
102
See Data Library: Current Research Returns, KENNETH R. FRENCH, https://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/
pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2021).
103
Data Bank: Federal Procurement Reports, SAM.GOV, https://sam.gov/reports/awards/static (last visited
Nov. 16, 2021).
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4 Reputation Concerns
5 Social-Issue Shareholder Proposals
6 Media Attention (Logged)
7 Past PAC Giving
8 Past Lobbying Expenditures
9 Federal Contractor
10 Logged Assets
11 Logged Employees
12 ROA
13 Election Year
14 Republican Control
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Descriptive statistics and correlations for all variables are displayed in
Table 1.
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d. Methods and Results
We test our models using a longitudinal panel generalized least squares
regression with a firm-year level of analysis. We replicate all models using both
fixed-effects and random-effects estimations. The random-effects estimation
can be interpreted as a between-firm comparison of the relationship between
reputation and tactical traceability; the fixed-effects approximation captures the
extent to which within-firm changes in reputation affect the traceability of
political activity. The fixed-effects model has the added benefit of reducing
concerns about endogeneity by controlling for all time-invariant firm
characteristics that might be driving the observed relationship between
reputation and tactical traceability.104 Unless otherwise noted, all independent
and control variables are lagged one year to ensure temporal precedence to
mitigate concerns of reverse causality. Across all models, we accounted for the
non-independence of observations by clustering standard errors by firm.
Results are provided in Table 2. The models show a number of interesting
findings among our control variables that warrant mentioning. We find some
evidence that firms that are more heavily monitored will turn to more covert
strategies in formulating their political activity, as media attention shows a
negative relationship with the traceability of political activity across our randomeffects models. This finding has particularly interesting policy implications, as
it suggests that firms whose behaviors are more closely monitored will opt for
less traceable tactics that frustrate monitors’ capacity to follow their political
activity. Insofar as the transparency of corporate interactions with politicians is
a policy priority, this finding highlights the need for disclosure to be mandated
through formal, regulatory means, given that informal monitoring appears to
exacerbate the opacity of ties between firms and political constituencies.
Our controls for election year and Republican control also have particularly
interesting implications. Across all models, we find that corporate political
activity tends to manifest in less traceable tactics during election years. This
aligns with our theory, insofar as politicians would naturally be more cautious
of the reputational risks inherent in visible corporate ties when they are actively
104
Though our primary models provide evidence of the hypothesized relationship between reputation and
the traceability of CPA, these models are ultimately only correlational. Recognizing that the relationship between
tactical traceability and reputation might be endogenous, we sought to increase confidence in the causal role of
reputation through a variety of robustness analyses, including an instrumental variables analysis and a
supplemental differences-in-differences analysis that exploits consumer boycotts as a plausibly exogenous shock
to corporate reputation. Given space considerations, we do not describe these analyses here, but provide full
descriptions of them in an online appendix, which can be accessed at Online Appendix, https://docs.google.com/
document/d/1JkVNga4Q1pLHVCNxAcHlI4mAkl0B0Wumec7zJFVpc7A/edit?usp=sharing (February 5, 2021).
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running for office, and problematic ties could be used to their opponents’
political advantage. We also find that firms tend to prioritize traceable tactics
during years in which the Republican Party is in control of Congress. This again
accords with our theory, as we expect Republicans to be less wary of traceable
ties to corporations given that the party is generally perceived to be friendlier to
business interests. Accordingly, ties with businesses—especially less
wholesome businesses—are likely to raise fewer eyebrows among Republicans’
core constituencies, as compared to Democrats’ core constituencies.
We test for a general relationship between a firm’s reputation and the
traceability of its political activity in Models 1 and 2, which implement randomeffects and fixed-effects specifications, respectively. Across both specifications,
we find a significant and positive relationship between a firm’s composite
reputation and the traceability of its political activity. Post-estimation margins
analyses105 of Model 1 reveal that the political traceability is roughly 25% higher
for firms with a reputation score at one standard deviation above the mean, as
compared to those at one standard deviation below the mean. Within the fixedeffects model, a firm that enjoys a one-standard deviation increase from the
mean reputation score is predicted to increase its political traceability by roughly
14%.
To unpack these initial results with more granularity, we break KLD
reputation rankings into separate scores of reputational strengths and concerns
in Models 3 and 4. While we find no significant relationship between
reputational strengths and political traceability in either model, we find a
significant negative relationship between reputational concerns and traceability
across both random- and fixed-effects models. Post-estimation margins analysis
of Model 3 reveals that the traceability score of firms with reputational concerns
at one standard deviation below the mean is 40% higher than that of firms with
reputational concerns at one standard deviation above the mean. Within the
fixed-effects model, a one standard deviation increase from the mean
reputational concerns score corresponds to a roughly 17% decrease the
traceability of political activity.
These initial models support our proposition that a firm’s reputation predicts
the relative traceability of its political spending. Further, the results show that
this relationship is principally driven by firms with negative reputations that
introduce more associative risk to the politicians that they seek to influence.

105

All reported post-estimation margins analyses are conducted with all control variables set to their mean.
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Table 2. Longitudinal Panel Regressions Predicting the Proportion of
Traceable Corporate Political Activity (CPA) Used by Members of the S&P 500

3. Study 2: The Relationship Between Corporate Reputation and
Obfuscation of Employer Relationships in Disclosures
Corporate political activity is the product of a function with a supply side
(the corporate giver) and a demand side (the political receiver). We have
theorized that less reputable firms turn to darker political activity because of
changes in the demand side: politicians are less receptive to observable ties with
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disreputable firms, and therefore less reputable firms favor less traceable
political tactics that do not produce observable ties. While our first empirical
investigation focused on the firm-side adjustments to political traceability made
in response to changes in reputation, our theory would also predict that political
campaigns would avail themselves of opportunities to obfuscate ties to
disreputable firms when possible. We explore this by examining the quality of
political campaigns’ disclosure of the employment information of CEOs from
whom they accept direct political contributions. By demonstrating that
contributors and campaigns exploit within-tactic opportunities to obfuscate ties
to problematic firms, this second study also helps to alleviate concerns that the
results obtained in Study 1 might be due to other differences in the specific
tactics we observe (for example, that PAC contributions are perceived as more
corrupt than lobbying).
In addition to corporate-affiliated PACs, a firm’s agents, such as individual
executives, can also contribute to candidates, and such contributions may be in
the service of their employers even though employees cannot be legally
reimbursed for (nor legally pressured into) such activity. Prior to 2003 and the
implementation of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), individuals
could contribute a maximum of $1,000 to any one candidate in an election
cycle.106 In January 2003, the contribution limit doubled to $2,000 and was
indexed to inflation going forward.107 Concurrently, the amount an individual
could give to a national political party in a year increased from $20,000 to
$25,000 and the aggregate amount that any one individual could contribute
across all counterparties was also increased from $25,000 to $95,000 per
election cycle.108 Both of these new limits were also indexed to inflation.109
The regulatory regime governing the disclosure of campaign contributions
from individuals (and hence the tactic’s traceability) is, at first glance, fairly
similar to the regime governing contributions from corporate-affiliated PACs.
Individual contributors must disclose the names and employment information of
individuals making contributions, and campaigns are required to make their best
efforts to verify this information, which ostensibly creates a public record of an
association between a politician and the employers of individual donors (if one

106

Pub. L. 107–155, title III, § 307.
Id.
108
Id.
109
On April 2, 2014 (after the end of our sample period), the Supreme Court in McCutcheon v. Federal
Election Commission struck down biannual aggregate caps on individuals giving to candidates, PACs, and
political parties. However, limits on individuals’ contributions to any one counterparty remain in place. 572 U.S.
185, 192–93 (2014).
107
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step removed from the firm itself).110 However, both contributors and campaigns
often obfuscate firm connections when disclosing individuals’ contributions,
ostensibly in an effort to decrease their traceability.
In approximately 13% of the 17,314 discreet campaign contributions that we
identified in the FEC data as coming from the CEOs of firms appearing in our
panel, disclosures either provided no employment information for the
contributor or identified a different job title and employer than the CEO or firm.
Some accomplished this by disclosing a vague occupational title for a CEO in
lieu of providing the firm’s name, even for prominent CEOs. For example, one
campaign listed the occupation of Michael Eisner of Disney as “Business
Executive” in the 2004 election cycle, and another reported that of Steve Ballmer
as the CEO of the Business Software Alliance, a trade association, rather than as
CEO of Microsoft in both the 2006 and 2010 cycles. One CEO in our sample is
referenced in a 2006 disclosure as principally employed as a “Race Car Owner,”
despite his position at the helm of a $7 billion-dollar company by market
capitalization. Similarly, rather than providing the names of their contributors’
employers, campaigns often disclose only that the employment information has
been “requested.” This tactic is used in the case of prominent CEOs that appear
in our data (e.g., Microsoft’s Steve Ballmer in 2006) and less well-known CEOs
(e.g., Monster Worldwide’s Andrew McKelvey in 2006).111 As an additional
check on our claim that associative risk and traceability drive the relationship
between reputation and tactical selection, we argue that campaigns are more
likely to obfuscate the employment information of individual contributions from
CEOs that represent less reputable firms.
a. Sample Construction and Measures
To conduct this analysis, we began by identifying the CEO of each firm in
our sample as reported in the Compustat and Execucomp datasets. If the name
of a firm’s CEO was unavailable in these datasets in a given year, we identified
its CEO by relying on archival materials, including its annual report and
coverage in the financial press. We then searched the FEC’s transaction-level
data of contributions made by individuals to political parties and candidates for
the names of the identified CEOs. We corroborated our name-based matching
by relying on the reported home address of a CEO, as provided to the FEC by

110

11 C.F.R. § 104.8 (2021).
See U.S. Federal Communications Commission, Campaign Finance Data: Individual Contributions,
U.S. FED. ELECTION COMM’N, https://www.fec.gov/data/receipts/individual-contributions/ (last visited Nov. 16,
2021).
111

SMCW_12.15.21

2021]

12/16/2021 10:24 AM

CORPORATE POLITICAL POWER

189

the party receiving the contribution. We then created variables capturing the total
amount of campaign contributions that a CEO made in a given year, as well as
the total amount of disclosed contributions in which the CEO’s employer was
not accurately named in the employment field.
The dependent variable in these analyses, CEO Contributions Obfuscated,
captures the proportion of a CEO’s total contributions that were obfuscated as
disclosed by the recipient campaign.
In Model 5 and Model 6 of Table 3, we reproduce the models from Table 2
with this dependent variable. All control variables are the same as in our primary
models, with the addition of a lagged dependent variable to capture trends in
obfuscation rates over time.
b. Results
As predicted, the results indicate that a firm’s reputation significantly
predicts the likelihood that a campaign will obfuscate the employment
information of a CEO when accepting a personal contribution. Model 5
demonstrates that a firm’s net reputation score predicts employment
obfuscation. In Model 6, we break reputation into separate measures of strengths
and concerns. We find that a firm’s reputational concerns make employment
obfuscation significantly more likely in campaign disclosures, while
reputational strengths make obfuscation significantly less likely. Thus, in this
setting, obfuscation that renders firm-campaign ties less traceable appears to be
driven by both positive and negative cues of corporate reputation. These results
provide additional support for our hypothesized mechanism, insofar as they
evidence that campaigns are warier to disclose ties to disreputable firms.
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Table 3. Firm Reputation and Obfuscation of Employer Ties in Disclosed
Contributions from Corporate CEOs

VARIABLES
Reputation
Score (Composite)

1. Proportion of CEO
Contributions
Obfuscated
-0.008
(0.003)

Reputation Strengths

-0.008
(0.004)
0.009
(0.004)

Reputation Concerns
Lagged
Proportion Obfuscated
Social-Issue
Shareholder Proposals
Media Attention
3-Year PAC Giving
3-Year
Lobbying Expenditures
Federal Contractor
Logged Assets
Logged Employees
ROA
Election Year
Republican Control
Fixed Effects for Year
Fixed Effects for Industry
Constant
Observations

2. Proportion of CEO
Contributions
Obfuscated

0.094
(0.044)

0.093
(0.044)

0.004
(0.009)
-0.025
(0.021)
-0.000
(0.000)

0.004
(0.009)
-0.026
(0.022)
-0.000
(0.000)

0.000
(0.000)
-0.074
(0.034)
0.030
(0.036)
0.044
(0.037)
0.420
(0.136)
0.005
(0.027)
0.062
(0.036)
YES
YES

0.000
(0.000)
-0.074
(0.034)
0.029
(0.037)
0.043
(0.039)
0.422
(0.138)
0.005
(0.027)
0.064
(0.040)
YES
YES

-0.114
(0.128)
1,030

-0.110
(0.127)
1,030
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II. THE CASE FOR MORE RIGOROUS TRACEABILITY OF CORPORATE
POLITICAL ACTIVITY
Our findings demonstrate that corporate political activity grows darker—that
is, shifts towards less traceable forms of activities—as firm public reputation
falls. The result is that the firms whose political interventions are likely to be
most controversial among the public are also those most likely to deploy their
political giving in ways the public cannot monitor. In so finding, we identify
limits to the hydraulics of corporate money based on firm reputation—limits
which plausibly attend to political giving more broadly. These empirical
findings support broader and more robust disclosure requirements of corporate
political activity, including with regard to corporate lobbying and individual
donations by CEOs and executives. Our findings demonstrate that the key
ingredient to effective reforms is traceability. Absolute levels of traceable
money in politics are limited by donor reputation. This is because open
association with disreputable donors is seen by fundraising politicians as a
liability, and so politicians reject or avoid those donations. As light is shed on
channels of darker money, and links to donors can be traced, donor reputation
limits the donations that politicians will accept.
There are, moreover, only so many things that are of potential value to
politicians (money donations, in-kind donations, donations of information, and
useful labor in the context of lobbying, such as running a study or drafting a bill
that the politician would otherwise pay for or staff herself). As methods of
contribution become less traceable, they become more expensive to the donor.
Consider contributions made by a firm via its PAC to a politician directly versus
contributions made by a firm via its treasury to a Super PAC that then spends
indirectly on behalf of the firm’s favored candidate. The former activity allows
the politician to buy advertising at a discounted rate, while the latter activity is
subject to market rates—thus, the cost of this form of political engagement
increases as the method becomes less direct.112 The firm in this example gets
more bang for its buck with more direct forms of contribution. Because the funds
of contributing firms are limited, reducing un- and less-traceable avenues of
contribution through rigorous disclosure requirements meaningfully constrains
corporate donations. Greater and more rigorous disclosure of campaign
contributions thus has the potential to limit the absolute amount of corporate
money in politics.

112

Yeager, supra note 68.
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A. Greater Traceability of Corporate Political Activity Would Enhance
Democratic Accountability
This section addresses the significance of our findings for First Amendment
theory and practice. First, it explains how the reforms articulated in Part II.B are
consistent with existing precedent on political process-related disclosures and
disclaimers and the “informational function” that they serve—if critically
operating by way of politician, not citizen or donor, action. Second, this Part
details how greater traceability of corporate political activity would enhance
democratic accountability in the very way that the Supreme Court has long
heralded as a, if not the, central goal of the First Amendment’s protection of
political speech. That is, we argue that increasing the traceability of corporate
political activity advances the reason the Court has previously found
information provided by election-related disclosures to be important and
constitutionally valuable: because they provide a mechanism by which
representatives are held accountable to the people. Third, this Part discusses
evidence that suggests increased traceability and the resultant decrease in
absolute levels of corporate money in politics would likely foster the public’s
belief that officials are accountable to the people, theorized by Robert Post to be
the meaning of the First Amendment’s accountability goal. Finally, we begin to
develop a theory of how the First Amendment might be reconceived to further
democratic and egalitarian ends, and act not only as a right from government
intervention but a right to accountably democratic government. For these
reasons, we argue that reforms detailed in Part II.B would not only further First
Amendment values, but are also required by them.
In this analysis, we stack the deck against ourselves. We assume for present
purposes that the freedom of speech protects lobbying in a manner analogous to
political spending. Although the Supreme Court has not yet reached the
question, some lower courts,113 scholars, and court watchers have made such an
assumption. Elizabeth Garrett, Ronald Levin, and Theodore Ruger have argued,
for example, that the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 is “primarily justified on
the ground that it combats political corruption” and is questionable under the
Supreme Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence.114 Rick Hasen has developed
113
See, e.g., Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 213, 245 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that the right to
spend personal funds for campaign speech is not limited to candidates and applies equally “to individuals and
organizations who are not themselves candidates”); Brinkman v. Budish, 692 F. Supp. 2d 855, 863–64 (S.D.
Ohio 2010) (applying the reasoning in Citizens United, which held limits on corporate donations to political
campaigns unconstitutional, in holding that a statute that prohibited uncompensated lobbying was
unconstitutional).
114
Elizabeth Garrett, Ronald M. Levin & Theodore Ruger, Constitutional Issues Raised by the Lobbying
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an important national economic welfare rationale for lobbying regulations on the
grounds that following the Supreme Court’s “deregulatory campaign finance
jurisprudence culminating in Citizens United,” lower courts are likely to find
lobbying regulations unconstitutional if justified on anti-corruption grounds.115
This assumption is not unrealistic, especially in light of the Supreme Court’s
current make up and the First Amendment’s larger libertarian turn.116
This Part develops an empirically grounded justification for regulations that
enhance the traceability of corporate money in politics, from soup to nuts,
including lobbying. These reforms take the form of disclosures that link, and
make public and observable, corporate money and those to whom it flows.
1. Traceability Mandates Are Consistent with Existing Precedent and the
Reason the Court Has Found Election-Related Disclosures
Constitutional
The Supreme Court has long treated election-related disclosures, like those
we recommend here, as different than limits on speech or money in politics.117
It has historically applied “exacting scrutiny,” which, prior to Americans for
Prosperity, required a “substantial relation” between a disclosure requirement
and a “sufficiently important” government interest.118 Now, it also requires
narrow tailoring.119 By contrast, the Court applies strict scrutiny, which requires
the government to prove that the law “furthers a compelling interest and is
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest,” to laws that burden political
speech.120 Disclaimer and disclosure requirements are less problematic from a
First Amendment perspective, the Court has explained.121 Although they “may
burden the ability to speak, . . . they ‘impose no ceiling on campaign-related
activities,’ and ‘do not prevent anyone from speaking.’”122

Disclosure Act, in THE LOBBYING MANUAL: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO FEDERAL LOBBYING LAW AND PRACTICE
197, 201 (William V. Luneburg et al. eds., 4th ed. 2009).
115
Hasen, supra note 17, at 195.
116
Although the assumption that the Court would treat lobbying regulations in line with its campaign
finance jurisprudence seems reasonable, Maggie Blackhawk (née McKinley) undertakes a historical excavation
of the petition clause, which weighs against this conclusion. See McKinley, infra note 181, at 1136.
117
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976) (considering election-related disclosures and ceilings on
campaign spending and affording the latter more constitutional protection).
118
See id. at 64; Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 366–67 (2010).
119
Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373, 2382 (2021).
120
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340.
121
Id. at 366–67.
122
Id. (citations omitted) (first quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64, then McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n,
540 U.S. 93, 201 (2003)).

SMC_12.15.21

194

12/16/2021 10:24 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71:153

The Court has found that disclosures are justified based upon the
government’s “informational interest” in “‘provid[ing] the electorate with
information’ about the sources of election-related spending.”123 Transparency,
the Court has explained, can help citizens “make informed choices in the
political marketplace,”124 deter donors from “hiding behind dubious and
misleading names,”125 and “alert the voter to the interests to which a candidate
is most likely to be responsive and thus facilitate predictions of future
performance in office.”126 The Court notes that “[w]ith modern technology,
disclosure now offers a particularly effective means of arming the voting public
with information” and “minimizes the potential for abuse of the campaign
finance system.”127
The Supreme Court has recognized a similar asymmetry between restrictions
and disclosures with regard to lobbying, observing that it “has upheld
registration and disclosure requirements on lobbyists, even though Congress has
no power to ban lobbying itself.”128 The Court validated the disclosures required
by the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946 in United States v. Harriss
in 1954.129 In so doing, it focused on the informational function of disclosures
to politicians in maintaining the integrity the political process:
Present-day legislative complexities are such that individual members
of Congress cannot be expected to explore the myriad pressures to
which they are regularly subjected. Yet full realization of the
American ideal of government by elected representatives depends to
no small extent on their ability to properly evaluate such pressures.
Otherwise the voice of the people may all too easily be drowned out
by the voice of special interest groups seeking favored treatment while
masquerading as proponents of the public weal. . . . Congress has not
sought to prohibit these pressures. It has merely provided for a
modicum of information from those who for hire attempt to influence
legislation or who collect or spend funds for that purpose. It wants only
to know who is being hired, who is putting up the money, and how

123
Id. at 367, 369 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66); see McConnell, 540 U.S. at 196; Daniel R. Ortiz, The
Informational Interest, 27 J.L. & POL. 663, 665–66 (2012) (describing the Court’s shift to the informational
interest).
124
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 197 (citation omitted).
125
Id. (citation omitted).
126
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67.
127
McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 223–24 (2014).
128
Citizens United, 588 U.S. at 369.
129
United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954).
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much. It acted . . . to maintain the integrity of a basic governmental
process.130

Harriss indeed analogized lobbying disclosures to “the restraint[s] resulting
from criminal libel laws”131 prior to New York Times Co. v. Sullivan132—
restraints on speech, in other words, that had then long been considered
constitutionally permissible.133
On these accounts, disclosures related to money in politics are
constitutionally valuable and subject to laxer review than restrictions because
they provide information to voters and politicians, which promotes the integrity
of the political process.
The traceability mandates advocated in the next subpart are in line with those
the Court has deemed permissible on this most basic (if empirically
questionable) informational account. They do not limit the amount of donations
that anyone can give, or that politicians can accept, and they accomplish the very
sorts of informational purposes the Court has previously identified.
Even despite Citizens United and Doe v. Reed’s relatively recent approval of
politics-related disclosures,134 mandatory disclosures are becoming an
increasingly key site of conflict in money in politics policy disputes and
litigation. This is in part because litigation to strike down substantive regulations
of money in politics has been so effective. Disclosure mandates remain one of
130

Id.
Id. at 626.
132
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 378 U.S. 254, 264 (1964).
133
Two years before Harriss, the Court in fact declared that libel was one of “certain well-defined and
narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise
any Constitutional problem.” Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 255–56 (1952) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942)). See generally Robert Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation
Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 691 (1986) (theorizing the social foundation of the
common law of defamation as a space in which civility norms are inculcated and developed—a process, Post
argues, upon which democratic norms and the public sphere depend).
134
Ciara Torres-Spelliscy has argued, for example, that Citizens United and Doe v. Reed create a doctrinal
foundation in favor of robust disclosure measures even outside of the campaign context and into issue advocacy
campaigns. Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Has the Tide Turned in Favor of Disclosure? Revealing Money in Politics
After Citizens United and Doe v. Reed, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1057, 1058 (2011); see Ciara Torres-Spelliscy,
Hiding Behind the Tax Code, the Dark Election of 2010 and Why Tax-Exempt Entities Should Be Subject to
Robust Federal Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws, 16 NEXUS 59, 61 (2010-2011); cf. Heather K. Gerken,
Wade Gibson & Webb Lyons, Rerouting the Flow of ‘Dark Money’ into Political Campaigns, WASH. POST
(Apr. 3, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/rerouting-the-flow-of-dark-money-into-politicalcampaigns/2014/04/03/1517ac6e-b906-11e3-9a05-c739f29ccb08_story.html (observing that whenever
regulations make it hard for wealthy donors to donate, they find another way, and arguing that to avoid the
rerouting of money in politics, and overcome dark money’s influence, Congress should work towards
transparency regulation).
131
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the few policy tools available, and challengers and regulators alike are
increasingly turning to disclosure requirements.135 Similar dynamics have made
disclosures in commercial speech, such as nutrition labels and health and safety
warnings, one of the most hotly contested First Amendment issues today and a
key front in First Amendment Lochnerism.136
At the same time, as Abby Wood and Daniel Ortiz have observed, mandatory
disclosures may not continue to be on as safe constitutional footing as many
assume.137 While the Court once accepted three independent constitutional
justifications for disclosure, as Ortiz has traced, it now recognizes only one: an
“informational interest.”138 Disclosure, as he says, “now hangs on this single
thread.”139 Putting more pressure on that thread, the membership of the Supreme
Court has changed, perhaps in ways that will make for a more disclosureskeptical Court.140 With mandatory disclosures likely to become an increasingly
critical site of conflict in money in politics policy disputes and litigation, more
scholarly attention must be paid to disclosures and their constitutional
justifications.
There are, in addition, deep First Amendment questions about anonymity
and its constitutional value. Anonymity was, of course, central to the Federalist
Papers.141 Or, consider NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, in which the Court
prohibited Alabama, on First Amendment grounds, from requiring the NAACP
to disclose the names of its members in light of the “uncontroverted showing
that on past occasions revelation of the identity of its rank-and-file members has
exposed these members to economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of
135
See Richard Briffault, Campaign Finance Disclosure 2.0, 9 ELECTION L.J. 273, 290 (2010) (“[F]or at
least some disclosure-only proponents, their endorsement of disclosure was more tactical than sincere. . . . So,
too, recent litigation challenges to campaign finance laws increasingly target disclosure requirements in addition
to rules limiting or barring certain finance activities.”).
136
See Shanor, supra note 42, at 138–76 (describing shifts in litigation and doctrine under the commercial
speech doctrine and their implications). In this respect, litigation and policy disputes about money in politics
appear to mirror those under the commercial speech doctrine. Corporate challengers, such as the tobacco
industry, first opposed restrictions on advertising and favored disclosures as less intrusive alternatives, only to
later challenge the constitutionally of disclosure mandates, including health and safety warnings. Id. at 169.
137
Wood argues that “[c]ampaign finance disclosure is under threat.” Abbey K. Wood, Show Me the
Money: “Dark Money” and the Information Benefit of Campaign Finance Disclosure 1, 1–4 (July 2020)
(unpublished manuscript under review) (on file at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
3029095); Ortiz, supra note 123, at 665–66.
138
Ortiz, supra note 123, at 665–66.
139
Id. at 666.
140
Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh, who have been more skeptical of disclosure, replaced Justices Scalia
and Kennedy, who were proponents of disclosure.
141
See, e.g., Benjamin Barr & Stephen R. Klein, Publius Was Not a PAC: Reconciling Anonymous
Political Speech, The First Amendment, and Campaign Finance Disclosure, 14 WY. L. REV. 253, 256 (2014).
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physical coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility.”142 While the
Supreme Court has likewise linked its campaign finance disclosure
jurisprudence to concerns about reprisal towards donors and the chilling of their
speech, it has generally been dismissive of those concerns in the campaign
finance context. In Buckley, for example, the Court recognized that “compelled
disclosure, in itself, can seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief
guaranteed by the First Amendment,” and disclosure “undoubtedly . . . will deter
some individuals who otherwise might contribute.”143 But absent evidence of a
“reasonable probability that compelled disclosure of . . . contributors’ names will
subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals from either [g]overnment
officials or private parties,” the Court has previously found the government’s
informational interest sufficient to overcome concerns of chilling speech.144
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Americans for Prosperity
Foundation v. Bonta, however, cut new and different ground.145 The case
addressed a California requirement that charitable organizations that fundraise
in the state disclose the identities of their substantial contributors to the state
Attorney General’s office.146 While the case involved the disclosure of donors
to non-profit organizations, the plurality used the “exacting scrutiny” standard
pulled from campaign finance law and appeared to articulate a general rule. It
added a narrow tailoring requirement, usually a feature of strict scrutiny, to the
“exacting scrutiny” standard.147 It now appears likely that all campaign finance
disclosure requirements—not only the ones that demonstrate that the plaintiffs

142
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462, 466 (1958); see also McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (upholding the right of anonymity in political pamphleteering);
Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960) (invalidating a city ordinance banning anonymous leaflets); William
McGeveran, Mrs. McIntyre’s Persona: Bringing Privacy Theory to Election Law, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 859, 861 (2011) (arguing anonymity promotes political participation and respects “personal interests in dignity
and autonomy”). We might also reflect on the anonymous op-ed by the Trump official who famously announced
that “many of the senior officials in [President Trump’s] own administration are working diligently from within
to frustrate parts of his agenda and his worst inclinations. I would know. I am one of them.” I Am Part of the
Resistance Inside the Trump Administration, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/05/
opinion/trump-white-house-anonymous-resistance.html.
143
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64, 68 (1976).
144
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 198 (2003) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 74); cf. Pamela S. Karlan,
The “Ambiguous Giving Out”: The Complicated Roles of Disclosure and Anonymity in Political Activity, 27
J.L. & POL. 655 (2012) (discussing the tradeoffs between anonymity and disclosure in political activity). Justice
Scalia went further in Doe v. Reed, in which the Court upheld a Washington statute that permitted the identities
of state referendum signatories to be revealed, arguing that “[r]equiring people to stand up in public for their
political acts fosters civic courage, without which democracy is doomed.” Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 228 (2010)
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
145
Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373 (2021).
146
Id. at 2379.
147
Id. at 2383.
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face a threat of retaliation or chill that amounts to a restriction on association—
will require narrow tailoring. It remains uncertain, however, whether or to what
extent the Court will require narrow tailoring for other sorts of disclosure
regimes. How far will the Court extend the narrow tailoring requirement? And
how will laws supported by the informational interest that has previously
supported politics-related disclosures fare? Certainly, campaign finance
disclosures of business organizations will now face more First Amendment
litigation.
While we will have to wait and see how significant a decision Americans for
Prosperity will turn out to be, our research suggests that increasing the
traceability of corporate political activity largely, though not entirely, sidesteps
the concern of chill that was central to the Court’s decision. As we have
demonstrated, the hydraulics of corporate political activity centrally depend on
the behavior of politicians—and their reluctance to take donations from
unpopular entities to whom they will then be tied publicly148—not the chilling
of donors’ interest to contribute.149
Unlike the concerns about members at issue in NAACP v. Alabama,150
increasing the traceability of corporate political activity in the main generates
concern about political consequences for the recipient politician. And that sort
of concern has long been recognized not to be a First Amendment problem, but
to further the established First Amendment value of holding officials
accountable to the people.
The Supreme Court has long celebrated the First Amendment as “the
guardian of our democracy,”151 saying, for example, that “[s]peech is an
essential mechanism of democracy, for it is the means to hold officials
accountable to the people.”152 This is because “[i]n a republic where the people
are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make informed choices among
candidates for office is essential.”153 The transparency provided by election148
Cf. Stan Oklobdzija, Public Positions, Private Giving, Dark Money and Political Donors in the Digital
Age, 6 RSCH. & POL. 1, 6 (2019) (finding that liberal donors gave to conservatives by way of dark money possibly
out of fear of backlash against their businesses or their reputations).
149
Cf. Abby K. Wood & Douglas M. Spencer, In the Shadows of Sunlight: The Effects of Transparency
on State Political Campaigns, 15 ELECTION L.J. 302, 303–04 (2016) (finding that the “chilling effect” of
disclosure is almost non-existent in an empirical study of state-level contribution data).
150
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462, 466 (1958).
151
Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60 (1982).
152
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010).
153
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1976); see also, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 339 (“The right
of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use information to reach consensus is a precondition to enlightened
self-government and a necessary means to protect it.”).
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related disclosures “enables the electorate to make informed decisions and give
proper weight to different speakers and messages,” and “can provide
shareholders and citizens with the information needed to hold corporations and
elected officials accountable.”154
Why does that matter? It explains why the Court has understood the First
Amendment to protect disclosures in the election context differently than
restrictions on political speech. Disclosures are subject to a laxer standard of
review on the grounds that they facilitate, rather than stymie, the ability of the
people to hold officials accountable.155
154
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 370–71. Kathleen Sullivan has accordingly described mandatory
campaign-related disclosure as providing “democratic accountability” gains. Kathleen Sullivan, Against
Campaign Finance Reform, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 311, 327 (1998). She wrote:

[Disclosure] places the question of undue influence or preferential access in the hands of voters,
who, aided by the institutional press, can follow the money and hold representatives accountable
for any trails they don’t like. It enables the distribution of political influence to be treated as a
political rather than a constitutional question.
Id. at 326.
155
There is a similar asymmetry between how the First Amendment treats restrictions versus disclosure
in the context of commercial speech. See, e.g., Shanor, supra note 42, at 147 (noting the “sharp asymmetry
between regulations that restrict commercial speech and those that compel it”); Post & Shanor, supra note 42,
at 173 (contrasting the “reasonably related” standard for compelled disclosures with the “intermediate scrutiny”
applied to restraints on commercial speech); Robert Post, Compelled Commercial Speech, 117 W. VA. L. REV.
867, 877 (2015) (“[R]estrictions on commercial speech and compulsions to engage in commercial speech are
constitutionally asymmetrical.”).
In the context of commercial speech, mandated factual disclosures are constitutional as long as they
are “reasonably related” to an identified governmental interest and are not so “[u]njustified or unduly
burdensome” as to “chill[] protected speech.” Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229,
250 (2010) (quoting Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns. of Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)). In
contrast, restrictions on commercial speech are subject to intermediate review. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980); see also id. at 573 (Blackmun, J., concurring in
the judgment) (referring to the Court’s analysis as “intermediate scrutiny”); Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S.
552, 565 (2011) (applying heightened scrutiny to Vermont law prohibiting dissemination of commercial
information); Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 647, 651 (applying “reasonably related” standard to mandated disclosure
but Central Hudson test to restrictions on advertising).
The difference between these two standards reflects the fact that the “First Amendment’s concern for
commercial speech is based on [its] informational function.” Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563. The Court stated
the following:
So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation of our resources
in large measure will be made through numerous private economic decisions. It is a matter of
public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this
end, the free flow of commercial information is indispensable. And if it is indispensable to the
proper allocation of resources in a free enterprise system, it is also indispensable to the formation
of intelligent opinions as to how that system ought to be regulated or altered.
Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976) (citations omitted); see
also, e.g., Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 114 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[M]andated disclosure of
accurate, factual, commercial information . . . furthers, rather than hinders, the First Amendment goal of the
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2. Traceability Would Foster Both Objective and Subjective Forms of
Democratic Accountability
We can understand the Court’s reasoning to reflect an objective account of
the purpose of speech in elections and perhaps of politics more broadly. The
Court imagines that information related to election spending is important
because it allows voters to hold officials accountable. Such information, on this
understanding, literally advances democratic accountability.156 As Karlan and
Issacharoff describe, there are roughly two theoretical camps that undergird this
sort of objective understanding of politics: (1) the pluralist-protective view that
sees “the purpose of politics as the aggregation of individual or group [either
pre- or post-political] preferences to enable voters either to obtain certain
benefits from the government or to prevent the government from depriving them
of pre-existing rights or entitlements,” and (2) the contrasting republicancommunitarian view that sees politics as a process of reasoned deliberation that
changes people’s preferences.157
On either understanding, the policy proposals we advance in the next
subsection are constitutionally valuable. We have empirically linked public
opinion to the actions of politicians based upon the traceability of corporate
money in politics. Put differently, disclosure appears to serve a unique role in
mediating politician behavior relative to corporate political activity. Disclosure
ties politicians’ acceptance of corporate contributions (and firms’ abilities to
influence politics) more solidly to (evolving) public views of firms’ reputations.
Traceability allows the public to more meaningfully hold officials accountable.
On this richer objective account, more rigorous disclosure is justified as a First
Amendment matter because it objectively serves democratic accountability.
In important respects, too, the account we provide offers an objective
account that ameliorates existing tension in the Court’s disclosure jurisprudence
over how it conceptualizes individual political decision-making and voter use of
information. Daniel Ortiz has notably observed a “deep instability” at the heart
of the “informational interest.”158 The Court’s disclosure jurisprudence, he
discovery of truth and contributes to the efficiency of the ‘marketplace of ideas.’”).
156
There is considerable criticism of the effectiveness and normative desirability of the effects of
disclosures, both generally and in the campaign finance context specifically. See, e.g., David E. Pozen,
Transparency’s Ideological Drift, 128 YALE L.J. 100, 158–59 (2018); OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E.
SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 54 (2014); Richard
Briffault, Two Challenges for Campaign Finance Disclosure After Citizens United and Doe v. Reed, 19 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 983, 985 (2011).
157
Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 25, at 1723–24.
158
Ortiz, supra note 123, at 680–81. Others have argued that the constitutional value of election and
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points out, assumes that voters are rational and civically engaged, while its
caselaw regarding other forms of campaign finance regulation rests on the
contrary assumption that voters are “rationally ignorant of politics and civically
disengaged.”159 Increasing the traceability of corporate political activity avoids
those concerns. Because the hydraulics of corporate political activity centrally
depend on the behavior of politicians—behavior we have empirically traced—it
does not rely on any particular account of voter behavior.
But the above objective accounts of political accountability are not the only
significant theories about the First Amendment status of campaign finance
regulation. Robert Post has prominently argued for a subjective, rather than
objective, understanding of First Amendment accountability of the officials to
the people, arguing that “[t]he point of First Amendment rights is . . . to
guarantee that each person is equally entitled to the possibility of democratic
legitimation.”160 Democratic legitimation, as he defines it, “occurs when persons
believe that government is potentially responsive to their views.”161 Post
contends that this process, as a social matter, operates through the public’s belief
that elections select officials who are responsive to public opinion, a concept he
terms “electoral integrity.”162 Post states the following:
First Amendment rights protect the possibility of participating in the
formation of public opinion. The hope is that government will be
responsive to public opinion and thus to the communicative efforts of
citizens. Elections are essential to the First Amendment because they
are the principal mechanism by which government is made responsive
to public opinion. If the public does not believe that elections choose
officials who attend to public opinion, the link between public
discourse and self-government is broken. . . . If the people do not
believe that elected officials listen to public opinion, participation in

lobbying-related disclosures, and the government interests that might justify disclosure mandates, are
undertheorized. See Lear Jiang, Note: Disclosure’s Last Stand? The Need to Clarify the “Informational Interest”
Advanced by Campaign Finance Disclosure, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 487, 490 (2019); Katherine Shaw, Taking
Disclosure Seriously, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. INTER ALIA 18, 18 (2016); see also Hasen, supra note 17, at
195 (observing “the rationales for lobbying regulations remain undertheorized” in comparison to the rich
literature on the anticorruption justification in the context of campaign contributions). But see Helen Norton,
Secrets, Lies, and Disclosure, 27 J.L. & POL. 641, 641 (2012) (articulating the value of listeners’ autonomy
interests).
159
Ortiz, supra note 123, at 679–80; see also id. at 681 (“These moves combine two incompatible notions
of how individuals make political decisions. On the one hand, voters are civically engaged enough ‘to separate
the wheat from the chaff’ in whatever speech they hear but, on the other, civically inert or incompetent enough
to need the protection of disclosure.”).
160
POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED, supra note 39, at 49.
161
Id.
162
Id. at 60.
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public discourse, no matter how free, cannot create the experience of
self-government.163

There is correlational data that suggests that increasing the traceability of
corporate political activity would advance democratic accountability in this
subjective dimension as well. International research by the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has shown that trust in
government is significantly correlated with “one’s belief that one has a say in
what the government does”164—that is, with the public’s belief that elected
officials listen to public opinion. As absolute corporate political activity has
increased, trust in government has plummeted, as has the belief that the
government is responsive to the people. As the Pew Research Center reports,
public trust in the U.S. government remains “near historic lows.”165 That trust
has fallen over the period in which concern about governmental corruption and
corporate political activity has sharply increased, namely since the late 1960s.166

163
Id.; see also id. at 64 (“Electoral integrity depends upon how Americans believe their elections actually
work.”). Post explains “[t]hat is why the First Amendment rights protect the opportunity of persons to participate
in public discourse in a manner they regard as meaningful, which is to say in a manner adequate to their own
convictions.” Id. at 50.
164
ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., GOVERNMENT AT A GLANCE 2019, PERCEPTION OF GOVERNMENT
RESPONSIVENESS: EXTERNAL POLITICAL EFFICACY (2019), https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/8ccf5c38en/1/2/10/2/index.html?itemId=/content/publication/8ccf5c38-en&_csp_=40825562de64089b975c3e83eb3f6e
04&itemIGO=oecd&itemContentType=book (R2=0.77). The OECD report explains:

[The perception that government is responsive to the people] is important as people expect that
their views and needs will affect the decisions taken by public institutions. . . . [This] is of
paramount importance to democratic systems as it relates to the belief that political and social
change are possible and that people can play a part in bringing about this change.
Id.
165
Public Trust in Government: 1958-2021, PEW RSCH. CTR. (May 17, 2021), https://www.pewresearch.
org/politics/2021/05/17/public-trust-in-government-1958-2021/. The American National Election Studies Guide
to Public Opinion and Electoral Behavior shows a similar generally downward trend for American’s perception
that people have a say in what government does. External Political Efficacy Index, 1952-2020, AM. NAT’L
ELECTION STUD., https://electionstudies.org/resources/anes-guide/top-tables/?id=117 (last visited Nov. 16,
2021).
166
Public Trust in Government, supra note 165. The American National Election Studies Guide to Public
Opinion and Electoral Behavior reflects a similar trend. Trust in Government Index, 1958-2020, AM. NAT’L
ELECTION STUD., https://electionstudies.org/resources/anes-guide/top-tables/?id=116 (last visited Nov. 16,
2021). For work on the increasing role of corporations in American politics since the late 1960s, see, for example,
HACKER & PERSON, supra note 15. As Hacker and Person describe:

The organizational counterattack of business in the 1970s was swift and sweeping—a domestic
version of Shock and Awe. The number of corporations with public affairs offices in Washington
grew from 100 in 1968 to over 500 in 1978. In 1971, only 175 firms had registered lobbyists in
Washington, but by 1982, nearly 2,500 did. The number of corporate PACs increased from under
300 in 1976 to over 1,200 by the middle of 1980. On every dimension of corporate political
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Over this same period, darker corporate political activity increased. While
limits on traceable corporate PAC contributions have not increased significantly
since the adoption of amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act in
1976, relatively untraceable firm-level lobbying expenditures (which have never
been capped) have increased significantly over this time.167 And, of course, in
2010, Citizens United affirmed firms’ ability to spend true “dark money” by
donating through non-profit corporations.168
Work by the OECD demonstrates a negative correlation between confidence
in the national government and the perception of government corruption.169 On
the flipside, international data shows a strong correlation between transparency
in public policymaking and public trust in politicians,170 and a significant
positive relationship between the perception that the government is responsive
to the people and satisfaction with democracy.171 This correlational data is
consistent with the conclusion that increasing levels of corporate money in
politics (and specifically darker forms of corporate money) negatively correlates
with the public’s perception that the government is responsive to the people. The
data is likewise consistent with the conclusion that public perception of
government responsiveness is positively correlated with transparency around
money in politics.
Rigorous traceability of corporate political activity, our research suggests,
would reduce disreputable corporate money in politics and perhaps overall
corporate money in politics. By doing so, the rigorous disclosures we advance
are likely to contribute to public trust in government and the belief that the
people can influence the political process.
By identifying policy changes that (1) would objectively render politicians
more responsive to public opinion and (2) likely increase the public’s subjective
activity, the numbers reveal a dramatic, rapid mobilization of business resources in the mid1970s.
Id. at 118.
167
See BENJAMIN C. WATERHOUSE, LOBBYING AMERICA: THE POLITICS OF BUSINESS FROM NIXON TO
NAFTA 18 (2014) (detailing trends in lobbying); see also LEE DRUTMAN, THE BUSINESS OF AMERICA IS
LOBBYING: HOW CORPORATIONS BECAME POLITICIZED AND POLITICS BECAME MORE CORPORATE 47–71 (2015)
(elaborating upon the history and growth of corporate lobbying).
168
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 360–61 (2010).
169
ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., GOVERNMENT AT A GLANCE 2019: TRUST IN GOVERNMENT (2019),
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/8ccf5c38-en/1/2/10/1/index.html?itemId=/content/publication/8ccf5c38-en
&_csp_=40825562de64089b975c3e83eb3f6e04&itemIGO=oecd&itemContentType=book.
170
WORLD ECON. F., GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2013-2014, at 413 tbl.1.04, 421 tbl.1.12 (2013),
https://www.weforum.org/reports/global-competitiveness-report-2013-2014 (r=0.75).
171
ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., supra note 164.
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belief that officials are responsive to public opinion, this Article locates reforms
that, as an empirical matter, would enhance democratic accountability.
3. The First Amendment Is Not Only a Right from Government Interference
but Also to Democratic Government
As we have argued, such reforms would be constitutional under a range of
understandings of the First Amendment and normative views of how democratic
politics should operate. But the ambition of this Article is to go further: Because
we have identified reforms that would empirically advance democratic
accountability—again, on a variety of constitutional and normative accounts—
those reforms should be understood not only as constitutionally permissible but
also required.172
Critics no doubt will contend that affirmative First Amendment democratic
accountability obligations are unrealistic, particularly against the backdrop of
our current Supreme Court and its likely shift from one conservative
constitutional vision to another—be it because we are shifting between
constitutional regimes (Reaganite to Trumpian), because the broader legal
culture has shifted from judicial restraint to libertarianism, because the Court’s
membership has changed, or some combination thereof. The Court’s partisan
gerrymandering case, Rucho, for instance, could be read to support an argument
that the Court is not committed to a vision of democracy that could possibly
encompass
affirmative
constitutional
obligations
to
democratic
accountability.173
We are unmoved by this critique for several reasons.
First, as we began this section, the Court has affirmatively embraced
disclosures as a favored solution to the potential ills of money in politics.174 It
has shown itself to be open to the idea that the First Amendment might contain
affirmative governmental obligations under the religion clauses,175 and the
reforms we suggest here are quite moderate in comparison.

172
See generally Louis Michael Seidman, The Dale Problem: Property and Speech Under the Regulatory
State, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1541, 1544 (2008) (dividing legal rules into those that are “constitutionally
impermissible, those that are constitutionally discretionary, and those that are constitutionally mandatory”).
173
Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2491 (2019).
174
See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 371 (2010) (“The First Amendment protects political
speech; and disclosure permits citizens and shareholders to react to the speech of corporate entities in a proper
way.”).
175
Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2262 (2020).
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Congress could also adopt these reforms absent any judicially recognized
First Amendment obligation. This is our hope. More important than the judiciary
reconsidering the First Amendment’s positive obligations is the need for
Congress to understand its role in ensuring First Amendment freedoms,
including through the adoption of democratic accountability measures.176 While
the Supreme Court over several decades has significantly diminished Congress’s
Section Five powers—that is, its constitutional authority to pass laws to enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment—in cases such as United States v. Morrison177 and
Shelby County,178 the First Amendment has no such baggage and holds
remarkable cultural magnetism.179 It is easily within the Overton window to
suggest that a broad coalition might advance a positive First Amendment vision
requiring campaign finance and lobbying reforms.180
In addition, growing historical work by scholars, including Maggie
Blackhawk,181 Nicholas Bowie,182 and James Gray Pope, have documented how
early constitutions were drafted “to justify exercises of popular power”183 and
advance “actual popular sovereignty.”184 They have described in rich detail the
ways in which assembly, petition, and association—particularly at the Founding,
but also at key later republican moments, including during the Civil Rights
revolution185—were understood to endow the people with a right to popular
sovereignty. Blackhawk explains that “[a]t the Founding, and for much of this
Nation’s history, the right protected a form of access to Congress that more

176
Amanda Shanor is grateful to Robin West, Marty Lederman, Mike Seidman, Gerry Spann, Gary Peller,
and the participants of the Georgetown University Law Center summer faculty workshop series for developing
her views on this point.
177
United States. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000).
178
Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013).
179
Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of
Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1789 (2004).
180
The Overton window is the range of policies that are considered within the mainstream of political
discourse. Things within that window are “on the wall” rather than off it. Organizing around the For the People
Act demonstrates that a positive vision of the First Amendment and increased campaign finance and lobbying
reforms are within the mainstream. That Act includes a range of voting rights and democracy reforms, from
increased disclosure requirements in political advertising and of corporate money in politics to small donor
public financing, to modernizing voter registration and access to the vote.
181
Maggie McKinley, Lobbying and the Petition Clause, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1131, 1183–84 (2016).
182
Nikolas Bowie, The Constitutional Right of Self-Government, 130 YALE L.J. 1652, 1657–58
(forthcoming 2021) (on file at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3676811).
183
James Gray Pope, Republican Moments: The Role of Direct Popular Power in the American
Constitutional Order, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 287, 336 (1990).
184
Id.
185
Id. at 336, 347–52; see also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 907–10 (1982) (holding
that a boycott organized by the NAACP against white merchants was a form of speech and association protected
by the First Amendment).
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closely resembled the formal process afforded in courts.”186 Petitioning gave
women, African Americans, and Native Americans access on “equal footing” to
others “no matter the petition’s source and without regard to the political power
of the petitioner.”187 She contrasts that with today’s lobbying system in which
“Congress affords individuals access to lawmakers and the lawmaking process
only on an informal basis and provides preferential access, consideration, and
procedure to the politically powerful.”188
In excavating the history of the Assembly Clause, Bowie likewise finds that
“[f]or over one hundred years before the First Amendment was drafted,
American activists advanced what they called their right to ‘assemble’ to defend
their right to govern themselves.”189 Bowie writes:
By the time the American colonists drafted their first assembly clauses
in the 1770s, the right to assemble was thus invoked to defend not
merely the act of assembling, but also the assemblies that could
exercise coercive legal powers to solve their constituents’ problem. In
other words, the state and federal assembly clauses were interpreted to
protect a constitutional right of self-government.190

Whether we accept Blackhawk or Bowie’s view that either the Petition
Clause or the Assembly Clause standing alone grants affirmative rights to
participatory self-governance or the contours of what that governance entails,
their work taken together demonstrates that a central goal of early American
constitutionalism and of the First Amendment was popular sovereignty.
By contrast to the petition or assembly clauses, there is a dearth of historical
evidence about what the Framers meant the Speech Clause to protect. The
existing evidence suggests the Framers did not intend the robust libertarian
approach that is the hallmark modern speech jurisprudence. The Sedition Act of
1798, for example, under which journalists and other government critics were
convicted and imprisoned, was passed just seven years after the ratification of
the First Amendment.191 The rich histories that Blackhawk and Bowie present
186

McKinley, supra note 181, at 1136.
Id. at 1137.
188
Id. at 1138.
189
Bowie, supra note 182, at 1658.
190
Id. at 1658–59.
191
The Sedition Act made it a federal crime to “write, print, utter or publish . . . any false, scandalous, and
malicious writing . . . against the government of the United States.” It was never held unconstitutional by any
federal court. Sedition Act of 1798, Ch. 74, §2, 1 Stat. 596 (1798) (expired 1801); see Akhil Reed Amar,
Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 59 (2000) (“Supreme Court Justices riding
circuit two centuries ago cheerfully enforced a Sedition Act that made mere criticism of certain incumbents a
federal offense.”).
187
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add significant historical context about early American political practice and the
Framers’ constitutional and institutional aims. That history suggests that the
goals of the First Amendment’s constellation of protections were rooted far more
deeply in goals of popular sovereignty than in the libertarian protection of
speech—a conclusion that should inform the meaning of the Speech Clause at
least from an originalist perspective.
For all these reasons, the First Amendment requires more robust and
thoroughgoing disclosures of corporate political activity as a concrete and
provable way to ensure that it can in fact be “the guardian of our democracy.”192
Such reforms would promote the sort of “actual popular sovereignty”193 that was
central to the early—and should be to the ongoing—American project.
***
The above analysis lays the beginning foundation for a freedom of speech
that would act not only as a right from government intervention, but also as a
right to democratic participation and accountability.
As something of a coda, we note that by focusing First Amendment theory
on questions of economic power and surfacing the way in which corporate
economic decisions operate politically, we aim to move beyond the twentiethcentury synthesis that scholars of political economy and law have described. As
Jed Britton-Purdy, David Grewal, Amy Kapczynski, and Sabeel Rahman
explain, that synthesis involves two related developments:
First, some legal subfields have been reoriented around versions of
economic “efficiency” . . . [including] contracts, property, antitrust,
intellectual property, corporate law, and so on. Here, efficiency
analysis anchors both the descriptive framing and the normative
assessment of law. . . . This methodological approach offers no
framework for thinking systematically about the interrelationships
between political and economic power.
The second move has redefined so-called political and public legal
fields, centrally constitutional law. Here, questions of coercion and
legitimacy remain central but are delimited to exclude economic
power and other structural forms of inequality. . . . As the economy
was read out of working conceptions of constitutional equality, it was
read back into constitutional law to enshrine certain forms of economic
liberty through developments in free-speech law. . . . The result is a

192
193

Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60 (1982).
Pope, supra note 183, at 336.
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vision of constitutional equality and liberty that enshrines structural
inequality and economic power.194

As they describe, as a result of the synthesis, “the economy has receded as a
subject in fields now reconstituted as fundamentally political, and politics has
receded as a subject in fields reconstituted as fundamentally economic.”195 Part
of how the synthesis operates, they and others have argued, is to render invisible
the influences of economic power on politics (and the political forces that shape
economic life).196
This Article pushes back against the synthesis. We seek to address the
pathologies of economic power in politics by making the empirical link between
corporate money, political influence, and the objective and subjective versions
of First Amendment theories of democratic accountability. The reforms we
suggest would make corporate money—and its influence on the political
system—visible.
B. Policy Reforms to Enhance the Traceability of Corporate Political Activity
Practically then, what should be done? A number of readily available policy
reforms would increase the traceability of corporate political activity.197 Federal
statutory regulation of lobbying and campaign finance would likely be the most
effective at advancing broad-based traceability—i.e., covering publicly traded
and privately held for-profit corporations, as well as non-profit corporations
used as conduits by for profits. But similar reforms could be adopted by state
and local governments with regulatory regimes that are laxer than what we
propose. Our findings should also, we hope, spur shareholders, including major
institutional shareholders, to demand greater disclosure of corporate political
spending. As Lucian Bebchuk, Robert Jackson Jr., James Nelson, and Roberto
194
Jedediah Britton-Purdy, David Singh Grewal, Amy Kapczynski & K. Sabeel Rahman, Building a Lawand-Political-Economy Framework: Beyond the Twentieth-Century Synthesis, 129 YALE L.J. 1784, 1790–91
(2020).
195
Id. at 1791.
196
See generally Grewal & Purdy, supra note 18, at 18 (noting that neoliberalism couches distributive
choices in “the neutral-sounding language of efficiency”); Purdy, Beyond the Bosses’ Constitution, supra note
42, at 2180 (describing “the current jurisprudence of distributional neutrality” in First Amendment law). Amanda
Shanor has described how the synthesis accomplishes this by treating First Amendment coverage questions as
natural questions of what is “speech.” Amanda Shanor, First Amendment Coverage, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 318,
331–33 (2018); Shanor, supra note 42.
197
See generally Jennifer A. Heerwig & Katherine Shaw, Through a Glass, Darkly: The Rhetoric and
Reality of Campaign Finance Disclosure, 102 GEO. L.J. 1443, 1147 (2014) (finding “compliance with providing
required information . . . is often both inconsistent and partial” and “[f]urther, the lack of an infrastructure to
track individual contributors over time impedes identification of the most potentially influential players in the
campaign finance system” based on an analysis of the Longitudinal Elite Contributor Database).
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Tallarita have persuasively argued, “[t]he case against such disclosure . . . is
simply untenable.”198
At the same time, while the Supreme Court has been sanguine about the
ability of “prompt disclosure of expenditures [to] provide shareholders and
citizens with the information needed to hold corporations and elected officials
accountable for their positions and supporters” and the fact that shareholders can
ensure “their corporation’s political speech advances the corporation’s interest
in making profits,”199 the reality is far different. For example, Congress has not
acted in the last ten years to close the disclosure loopholes that Citizens United
created via 501(c) non-profits that keep shareholders and the public in the
dark.200 Further, in continuing resolutions funding the federal government since
2015, Congress has prohibited the Securities & Exchange Commission from
engaging in rulemaking designed to enhance disclosure of corporate political
activity.201 That prohibition may expire with unified Democratic control of the
federal government, which would allow the SEC under new Chair Gary Gensler
to make those disclosures a reality. SEC rules designed to increase the
traceability of corporate political activity would advance the goals we identify
above and may be the most politically feasibly in the short term. However,
because any SEC rulemaking would not reach privately held firms, a legislative
solution is ultimately needed.
We begin by addressing reforms to lobbying disclosure. The American Bar
Association’s (ABA) Task Force on Federal Lobbying Laws has proposed
several enhancements to lobbying disclosures that would enhance traceability of
corporate political activity by deepening and broadening the current disclosure
regime under the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) and as amended by the Honest

198
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Robert J. Jackson, Jr., James D. Nelson & Roberto Tallarita, The Untenable Case
for Keeping Investors in the Dark, 10 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1, 2 (2020); see CTR. FOR POL. ACCOUNTABILITY,
COLLISION COURSE: THE RISKS COMPANIES FACE WHEN THEIR POLITICAL SPENDING AND CORE VALUES
CONFLICT AND HOW TO ADDRESS THEM 12–14, 24, 26 (2018), https://politicalaccountability.net/hifi/
files/Collision-Course-Report.pdf; Timothy Werner & John J. Coleman, Citizens United, Independent
Expenditures, and Agency Costs: Reexamining the Political Economy of State Antitakeover Statutes, 31 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 127 (2015).
199
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 370 (2010).
200
As we discuss supra note 16, the holding in Citizens United allows firms to make unlimited
contributions to 501(c) non-profit organizations. Contributions to 501(c)s do not need to be disclosed to the
public, including the shareholders of publicly traded corporations, unless they are specifically earmarked for
electoral activity. Thus, although the Court upheld campaign finance disclosure in principle in Citizens United
by allowing corporations to contribute to 501(c)s, it created a corporate political tactic that evades existing
disclosure regimes.
201
Werner, supra note 13, at 2425.
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Leadership and Open Government Act (HLOGA) of 2007.202 Prior to the
adoption of the LDA, corporate lobbying efforts at the federal level were not
disclosed to the public in a systematic fashion. Based upon activity thresholds
detailed below, the LDA introduced biannual reporting by lobbying
organizations and individual lobbyists, and the HLOGA increased the frequency
of this reporting to a quarterly basis.203 From the perspective of traceability, the
reporting requirements of the LDA and HLOGA are quite lax, as neither
mandates lobbying organizations or lobbyists to report the names of the
individual legislators or regulators whom they are targeting.
Importantly, the ABA’s reforms would place greater disclosure burdens on
organizations, including publicly traded corporations, and fewer on individuals,
such as lobbyists. That burden shift would address the current incentives to
evade registration as a lobbyist that were created by the HLOGA’s amendments
to the LDA and Obama-era rules for individuals (e.g., additional campaign
finance and gift disclosure rules, and possible civil and criminal penalties for
non-compliance with the LDA and HLOGA disclosure rules).204 Contrary to
their stated goal of enhancing disclosure to the public, the restrictions that those
regulations placed on registered lobbyists have generated “shadow” lobbying
activities that are not disclosed.205 At the same time, there has been a drop in
reported federal lobbying expenditures, leading researchers to raise significant
doubts about whether these trends empirically capture the reality of lobbying in
Washington, D.C.
Instead of limiting the activity of lobbying, the ABA’s recommendations
seek to enhance lobbying disclosure by broadening the activity covered by the
LDA and deepening the level of disclosure of that activity. As Richard Briffault
writes, disclosure “is particularly valuable in the lobbying context because it
gives legislators a greater understanding of the pressures to which they are
subject, informs individuals and interest groups of the activities of their
competitors, and has the potential to improve the public’s understanding of its
government.”206
202
See Charles Fried, Rebecca H. Gordon, Trevor Potter, Joseph E. Sandler & Robert M. Levin, Lobbying
Law in the Spotlight: Challenges and Proposed Improvements, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 419, 439–65 (2011).
203
Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-81, § 201, 121 Stat. 735.
204
See Tim LaPira, Erring on the Side of Shady: How Calling Out “Lobbyists” Drove Them Underground,
SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Apr. 1, 2014), https://sunlightfoundation.com/2014/04/01/erring-on-the-side-of-shady-howcalling-out-lobbyists-drove-them-underground/.
205
Hasen, supra note 17, at 247–49.
206
Richard Briffault, Lobbying and Campaign Finance: Separate and Together, 19 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 105, 119 (2008); see also Heather Gerken, Keynote Address: Lobbying as the New Campaign Finance, 27
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1155, 1160 (2011) (noting that after Citizens United, reform must “move in new directions .

SMCW_12.15.21

2021]

12/16/2021 10:24 AM

CORPORATE POLITICAL POWER

211

In terms of breadth, the ABA’s proposed reforms would require a lobbying
firm (e.g., a lobbying shop acting as an agent of a publicly traded corporation)
to register if its employees make two or more lobbying contacts on behalf of a
client and the firm expects to receive quarterly revenue above a certain threshold
for engaging in lobbying activities on behalf of that client. Similarly, a lobbying
organization (e.g., a publicly traded corporation lobbying on its own behalf)
would be required to register if its employees make two or more lobbying
contacts and the organization has quarterly expenditures on lobbying activity
above a certain threshold.207 These new requirements would drop an existing
second condition on an employee’s time usage: currently, an employee must also
spend a minimum of twenty percent of their time on lobbying activity in order
for the reporting requirements for lobbying firms and organizations to be
triggered in the LDA.208 Thus, these changes would do much to shrink the
untraceable “shadows” in which much modern, post-HLOGA lobbying seeks to
hide.
In terms of the depth of lobbying, the ABA proposes two reforms that our
empirical findings support. First, principal lobbying organizations and their
agent lobbying firms should disclose “the bills and topics with respect to which
lobbying activity was conducted.” Second, these actors should list “all
congressional offices, congressional committees, and federal agencies and
offices contacted” as part of this lobbying activity.209 This level of disclosure
would not only greatly enrich all actors’ understanding of the policy process by
providing the exact traceability that our lobbying disclosure system currently
lacks and our results suggest is needed, but it would also strike a middle ground
between the current lax LDA requirements and the much more invasive lobbying
reports required of foreign-owned corporations specified in the Foreign Agents
Registration Act.210 Second, the ABA’s reforms, in light of the fact that many
modern lobbying campaigns involve multiple agents (e.g., pollsters, grassroots
consultants, and media strategists) coordinated by the principal lobbying
organization or a key lobbying firm/agent, also would require extensive
disclosure of “all other persons and entities retained by the registrant firm or

. . . This will be particularly true as disclosure and transparency become the constitutionally safe options for
reformers . . . . [C]ampaign finance and lobbying, . . . connected in practice, will also grow together in theory
and in policy”).
207
“Employee,” “lobbying contacts,” and “lobbying activity” are defined in 2 U.S.C. § 1602 (2006); the
threshold dollar amounts are set in 2 U.S.C. § 1603(a)(3) (2006).
208
Fried et al., supra note 202, at 439.
209
Id. at 443.
210
See Foreign Agents Registration Act, Pub. L. No. 75–583 (1938).
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organization that engaged in ‘lobbying support,’”211 as well as details including
a narrative summary of their work and their total compensation. This reform
would include grassroots campaigns designed to influence specific legislation or
regulation, but would exclude grassroots campaigns more broadly targeting
public discourse or opinion. Most significantly, this reform would hamper
distancing efforts designed to hinder traceability between a corporation’s
political activity and a policymaker’s decision-making.
Beyond this, our findings support adding an already established
organization-level unique identifier to firms’ quarterly lobbying disclosure
reports, allowing lobbying information to be easily linked to other required firm
disclosures. Such unique identifiers include the Securities and Exchange
Commission’s Central Index Key (CIK) and Standard & Poor’s Committee on
Uniform Securities Identification Procedures (CUSIP) number for publicly
traded firms or Dun and Bradstreet’s (DUNS) number for both publicly traded
and privately held firms.212 This linkage would allow the general public
(including academic researchers and the media) to better understand the
motivations behind firms’ political activity; it would allow competing interest
groups (including public interest groups) to better counteract their adversaries’
advocacy in a Madisonian faction-versus-faction sense;213 and it would allow
shareholders to more easily monitor management’s political activity for
potential agency problems.214 Further, because disclosures as a governance tool
are most effective “when they provide[] facts that people wanted in times,
places, and ways that enable[] them to act,”215 we argue that linking firm
political activity to widely used and publicly available firm identifiers is
essential in enhancing the accountability of the political system to the people.216

211

Fried et al., supra note 202, at 443.
More broadly, we would also endorse the call of the non-profit Data Foundation, as well as LexisNexis,
for the U.S. and state governments to adopt a universal, nonproprietary unique identifier for any firm, non-profit,
or other organization engaging in financial transactions. This Legal Entity Identifier (LEI) is defined by
International Organization for Standardization Standard 17442. See SCOTT M. STRAUB & MATT RUMSEY, WHO
IS WHO AND WHAT IS WHAT? THE NEED FOR UNIVERSAL ENTITY IDENTIFICATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1, 4
(2017).
213
See generally Anita S. Krishnakumar, Towards a Madisonian, Interest-Group Based Approach to
Lobbying Regulation, 58 ALA. L. REV. 513 (2007) (explaining how lobbying regulations might allow interest
groups to check one another in a Madisonian fashion).
214
See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?, 124
HARV. L. REV. 83, 104–07 (2010).
215
ARCHON FUNG, MARY GRAHAM & DAVID WEIL, FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF
TARGETED TRANSPARENCY, at xiv (2007).
216
Another benefit of using a pre-existing unique identifier for disclosure of corporate political activity is
that it would neither impose new administrative burdens on government agencies nor require a reordering of
agency oversight of corporate political activity or campaign finance and lobbying activity more broadly, since
212
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Turning to potential enhancements of campaign finance disclosure, our
findings suggest that corporate-linked PACs should be required, as part of the
quarterly disclosure of their campaign activity to the FEC, to link themselves to
their corporate parents not just by identifying the parent firm’s name, but also
by identifying its CIK, CUSIP, or DUNS number. Such an identifier would
provide not only the same benefits as discussed above with regard to lobbying,
but it would also provide the same set of watchdog actors (citizens, competing
interest groups, and shareholders) an easier way of tracing the phenomenon we
document here: firms’ campaign finance and lobbying strategies are linked and
adjust in relation to one another. Further, we recommend that a similar unique
identifier requirement be applied to any independent expenditures made directly
from a firm’s treasury and that an identical, look-through requirement be applied
to any independent expenditures made indirectly through an independent
expenditure-only committee (i.e., a “Super PAC”). Both activities are already
subject to quarterly reporting with the FEC,217 so the new reporting burden
would again be de minimis for firms.
In a similar vein, we believe that corporate contributions to 501(c)(4) and
(c)(6) non-profit corporations—social welfare organizations and business
leagues (i.e., trade associations), respectively—need to be disclosed by the
contributing firm to the FEC using the same unique identification number.
Currently, these non-profit corporations are not required to disclose their
contributors.218 Since these organizations have long played a role in lobbying,
and have also played a role in campaign finance post-Citizens United, they are
another conduit through which corporate money can hydraulically flow.
Additionally, because there is no public disclosure of contributors to these
organizations, there is zero ability for legislators, competing interest groups,
shareholders, or the public to know who is participating in the public policy
process via them and thus no ability for any of these actors to hold anyone
accountable.
As our study of CEO contributions reveals, firms can also employ individual
employees as intermediaries in politics, and campaigns can avail themselves of

data sets could now easily be linked across administrative bodies. Additionally, it would require minimal
marginal effort on the part of firms during the disclosure process.
217
11 C.F.R. § 104.3 (2021) (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 30104(b), 30114); 11 C.F.R. § 114.10
(2021).
218
Prior to July 2018, all non-501(c) non-profit corporations were required to confidentially identify their
contributors to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS); now, these corporations need only keep this information on
file and subject to IRS request. See I.R.S. Rev. Proc. 2018-38 (July 16, 2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irsdrop/rp-18-38.pdf.
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opportunities to obfuscate the relationships between CEOs and companies. As a
result, and as perhaps a first effort at capturing firms’ strategic political use of
employees, we suggest that those executives of a publicly traded firm covered
by Section162(m)(3) of the U.S. tax code (e.g., the CEO, chief financial officer,
and the three other most highly compensated executive officers),219 along with
a firm’s board of directors, also be required to link their campaign contributions
to their associated firm through the same unique identification number as is used
in the firm’s other campaign finance and lobbying disclosures.220 Further, we
would extend this linkage requirement with regard to personal campaign
contributions to those actors at privately held firms who would be covered by
the pay disclosure regulation were their firms publicly traded.
It is important to note that this enhanced disclosure would impose neither
additional limits on the speech of executives or directors nor a significant
reporting burden (certainly, the requirement of tying one’s political activity to a
firm via a unique identifier is a simple inconvenience for executives, especially
considering that these individuals’ compensation in the case of publicly traded
companies and individual campaign contributions in the case of all companies
are already public). Additionally, this enhanced disclosure would pale in
comparison to the regulations put on the campaign finance activity of registered
lobbyists as part of the HLOGA.221 These proposed regulations on the
organizational and individual intermediaries that firms can use not only will help
give interested parties a fuller picture of the hydraulics of corporate political
activity generally, but they will also help the public and media trace whether
candidates’ pledges to reject corporate support in their campaigns are more than
just cheap talk that could result in additional loss of trust in the political
process.222
These reforms would significantly enhance the traceability of corporate
political activity. We recognize, however, that the reforms we advance are

219

See 26 U.S.C. § 162(m)(3) (1994).
Such a form would necessarily have to account for interlocks across firms and thus require executives
and directors to enter in the unique identifier of each firm to which they are connected. Unfortunately, this would
be required at the time of each contribution unless the FEC were to create a unique identifier for individual
contributors that could then be used to trace a contributor’s behavior within and across election cycles.
221
See Briffault, supra note 206, at 106, 119–20.
222
See Brian Kelleher Richter & Timothy Werner, Campaign Contributions from Corporate Executives
in Lieu of Political Action Committees, 33 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 443, 445–46 (2017); Karl Evers-Hillstrom,
Democrats Are Rejecting Corporate PACs: Does It Mean Anything?, OPENSECRETS (Dec. 7, 2018, 3:14 PM),
https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2018/12/democrats-say-no-pacs/; Lee Fang, These House Democrats
Pledged Not To Take Corporate Cash—But They’re Using a Loophole To Do It Anyway, INTERCEPT (Apr. 13,
2019), https://theintercept.com/2019/04/13/democrats-corporate-pac-money/.
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incremental. There are limitations to our approach that might pose more difficult
First Amendment issues. Principally, these relate to the disclosure of corporate
contributions to grassroots campaigns that are not clearly linkable to pending
elections, legislation, or regulation, as well as contributions to 501(c)(3) nonprofit corporations, including charities and think tanks. Despite this latter set of
organizations being prohibited from engaging in lobbying, increasing evidence
suggests that corporate contributions to these entities pay political benefits.223
Because such contributions may fund indirect forms of lobbying, they raise the
possibility of additional untraceable avenues through which corporate money
can flow; thus, reformers seeking policy interventions beyond the disclosurebased reforms advanced here may need to pay greater attention to these nonprofits. That being said, because of the necessarily indirect forms of lobbying
that corporations might do by way of 501(c)(3)s and such grassroots campaigns,
these avenues for corporate political activity currently provide less certain
political benefit to firms than the central pathways by which darker corporate
money now flows: direct lobbying and contributions by CEOs and C-suite
executives.224
The reforms we identify target those main arteries of corporate dark money
with the aims of stemming its untraceable and influential flow and meaningfully
enhancing politician accountability and public trust. But, as with any realistic
regulatory change, the prospect of evasion and the exertion of power against
control raise the possibility that these reforms will require periodic adjustment.
CONCLUSION
Our empirical research identifies a key force in the hydraulics of corporate
political activity: a firm’s public reputation. We provide robust empirical and
theoretical evidence for policy changes that would increase the traceability of
corporate money in politics, including more robust and thorough disclosures of
lobbying and the firm associations of corporate executives. By leveraging the
desire of politicians to avoid association with publicly unpopular firms, we
locate reforms that, as an empirical matter, not only run to core First Amendment
values, but also should be understood as required by them. Increasing the
traceability of corporate political activity would render politicians more
responsive to public opinion and increase the public’s perception that this is so,

223
See Marianne Bertrand, Matilde Bombardini, Raymond Fisman, Brad Hackinen & Francesco Trebbi,
Hall of Mirrors: Corporate Philanthropy and Strategic Advocacy, 136 Q.J. ECON. 2413, 2461 (2021).
224
Indirect pathways are also often both more practically difficult and expensive for firms to pursue. See
Yeager, supra note 68.
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promoting both the reality and belief that the public can hold officials
accountable to We the People.

